On the Success and Progressiveness of (Some) Modern Restorations[1]

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1. Introduction: The Idea of Comparative Historical Sociology of Restorations

Both great modern revolutions (the French in 1789 and the Russian in 1917) ended with restorations – in 1815 and in 1989–1991 respectively. Revolutions are the subject matter of an enormous body of comparative historical and sociological work. Experts in this thriving field of research distinguish at least four generations of theoretical work (Goldstone 2001; Foran 1993). Theda Skocpol's (1979) comparative analysis of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions is famous as one of the most cited works in the social sciences (Goodwin 1996). Although there is certainly no lack of historical work on British (1660–1688), French (1815–1830) and other (e.g., Spanish 1874–1931) restorations (Barton 2009: 190–210; Démier 2012; Harris 2005; Waresquiel 2015; Waresquiel and Yvert 2002), there have only been very few attempts at the comparative historical or sociological analysis of restorations (e.g., Kann 1968; Sellin 2014; Stepan 1986; Stråth 2016).

Among the seminal works, the contribution of Austrian-American historian Robert Kann (1906–1981) is the most important. Kann (1968) provided a comparative historical study of selected restorations, starting with the first restoration of Israel after the return of Jews from Babylonian captivity in the sixth century BC and closing with the restoration of the German empire in 1871. I take from Kann the idea of restoration as the final component in a larger pattern of social change, featuring the sequence of original (A), intermediate (B) and restored (C) social systems, where the restored system affirms, constructs or claims continuity with the original (or ancient) system that was disrupted by the revolutionary transition from the original to an intermediate system.

Differently from Kann, I limit the scope of analysis to modern restorations that followed great modern revolutions. The main reason for this delimitation is that only in modern societies were revolutions counter-opposed to restorations and thus received a positive evaluative connotation. This opposition is absent in the socio-political vocabulary of traditional societies, which assumes the circularity of social and political change as well as the normativity of the ancient past (Koselleck 2004; Suvanto 1997). 'In traditional societies, lived time was more circle than arrow, lived annals overwhelmingly repetitive, human nature enduringly the same. <...> Although Judaeo-Christianity posited a flow of time in which events happened only once, repetitive resurrection and re-enactment suffused religious faith' (Lowenthal 1999: 466). Before the French Revolution of 1789, both 'revolution' and 'restoration' meant just a 'change in direction' (Koselleck 2004). Supporters of this kind of change presented or inscenised it as 'restoration', hoping or promising that it would bring back 'the old good times', while defenders of the status quo exposed and indicted them as dangerous innovators.

The English 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, which some historians (Pincus 2009) describe as 'the first modern revolution', was no exception. From the perspective of the victorious revolutionaries themselves, the Glorious Revolution was just the restoration of England's ancient constitutional

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order, broken by James II Stuart, who attempted to abolish constraints on his power by the Parliament and wished to transform England into an absolutist monarchy after the example of Louis XIV in France. 'They regarded themselves not as revolutionaries demolishing the power of the crown, but as conservatives correcting revolutionary tendencies on the part of previous monarchs' (Williams 1960: 3).

Sharp opposition between revolution as a positively valued dominant term and restoration as its subordinated complement, loaded with negative meaning, is one of the legacies of the French Revolution. 'The modern idea of revolution goes back no further than 1789' (Doyle 2002: 421). This was the idea that it was possible and right to overturn the existing social order by force on the grounds of abstract principles or a perfect future, rather than historical tradition or existing law. Therefore, the French Revolution did become and remains a classical or paradigmatic case of a modern revolution. This also happened with the Bourbon restoration (1815–1830).

Puzzled with this outcome to the French Revolution, opponents of the restored Bourbon monarchy looked for elucidation in the history of neighbouring England, considering the Stuart restoration (1660–1688) as the British precedent and equivalent of the Bourbon restoration (Bigand 2010; Cubitt 2007; Mellon 1958). Among liberal opponents of the Bourbon regime, such comparisons nourished the hopes that it would not last. Indeed, the victors of the French Revolution of July 1830, which established the July Monarchy (1830–1848) under the Orléans branch of the House of Bourbon, perceived themselves as re-enacting the script that had been played out in England in 1688.

Although the 1848 revolution did expose the limits of this historical parallel, based on the modernising misperception of the Glorious Revolution of Britain, after the revolution of July 1830 the word 'restoration' received the connotation of a short-lived reactionary regime doomed to fail (Kondylis 1984). Since this time, the concept of restoration 'denotes the questionable attempt to renew an obsolete reality in opposition to the spirit of the time. The history of the Bourbon restoration in France seems to confirm this judgment, since the restored dynasty remained in power for only sixteen years' (Sellin 2014: 1). The legacy of the failure of the first modern restoration is an opposition between good revolutions and bad (albeit short-lived and doomed) restorations. It still blocks the emergence of comparative research on social restorations on its own or as an extension of the research on revolutions.

Kann's conflation of modern and pre-modern restorations may be one of the reasons why his ground-breaking research was not received and was not continued. Another reason is that he just did not live long enough to witness the breakdown of most communist regimes in 1989–1991, inaugurating another wave of modern restorations and greatly expanding the population of their cases.The expansion of the population of cases of modern social restoration with new cases that Kann did not know of or neglected prompts a deconstruction of the received opposition of revolution as progressive and sustainable and restoration as reactionary, regressive and unsustainable social transformation.

2. Key Distinction: Endurance and Performance Success of Restorations

In 1972 Henry Kissinger asked the Prime Minister of Communist China Zhou Enlai what he thought about the success of the French Revolution – Enlai's response was that it is too early to say. My thesis is that while it is still too early for the ultimate assessment of the success of capitalist restorations, enough time has passed for some preparatory work.

In this assessment, a distinction should be made between endurance success and performance success. The endurance success of a restored social system means that it endures longer than its predecessors (intermediate and original regimes). Performance success means that it increases human wellbeing more than its predecessors and is thus progressive in the absolute (increasing rather than decreasing wellbeing) and relative (accelerating the increase of wellbeing) sense. The time for making the ultimate judgement on the endurance success of post-communist restorations will arrive when

restored post-communist states, economic or political regimes will outlast their predecessors (by 2040–2050). However, their performance success (or progressiveness) can already be assessed now.

The general criterion of restoration endurance success (CRES) can be formulated as follows:

CRES (Criterion of restoration endurance success): ***Restored social system (C) is endurance successful if it endures longer than intermediate social system B. If original system A endured shorter than intermediate system B, and restored system C endured longer only than A, then restored system C is partially successful. If A endured longer than B, and restored C endured longer than both A and B, then C is extremely successful.***

In this formulation, the abstract term 'social system' is used to allow its application to different kinds of social systems, including economic systems, political regimes and states. Its general scope means it can also apply to configurations of international order, which are actually social mega-systems. It makes restoration endurance success relative to the duration of the original and intermediate systems. The restored system takes a longer time to demonstrate its endurance success against a long-lived, intermediate post-revolutionary system than against a short-lived system. If the restored Bourbon monarchy would have endured at least until 1841, it would have proved the endurance success of its restoration because at the moment of the counterfactual celebration of the 26th anniversary of its (second) restoration in 1815, it would have endured as long as the complete revolutionary era (1789–1815).

Surely those regimes that display weaker performance than intermediate or original regimes are expected to be destroyed by new revolutions, although their timing cannot be predicted from the values of economic or social performance indicators. Failing restoration regimes may survive if they receive assistance from powerful foreign sponsors. In the long run, rapid progress in the most performance successful restoration regimes may create new problems and challenges, making them vulnerable to revolutions of new and still unknown kinds.

The real problem is the availability of relevant data suitable for making cross-time comparisons. This applies not only to post-communist restorations of capitalism and Third-wave restorations of democracy, but also to the first cases of modern restorations after 1815. The failure of the restored Bourbon regime in the sense that it did endure less (1815–1830) than the post-revolutionary Napoleonic regime (1799–1814) or the entire intermediate period (1789–1814) does not exclude the possibility that it performed better economically and socially (and so was progressive) in comparison with the intermediate period. Whether this was the case or not can be established only by conducting empirical economic and social research.

An important lesson from the first modern (and classical) restoration after the French Revolution is that the 'hard core' agenda of a revolution can be implemented not by revolutionary or post-revolutionary regimes, but during the restoration or by post-restorational regimes by historical actors who perceive themselves as bona fide counter-revolutionaries or reactionaries. There was neither a free market, nor representative government, nor protection of civil rights (rule of law) during the Jacobin dictatorship in 1793–1794. Neither the Thermidor regime, which was a self-perpetuating oligarchy of the regicides that survived the Jacobin terror, nor Napoleon's post-revolutionary dictatorship were able to implement the 'ideas of 1789'. Effective rule of law was implemented for the first time in French history under the restored Bourbons in 1815–1830. One of the most important ideas of 1789 was the idea of a nation state, which drove the revolutionary wars of the French republic to liberate neighbouring peoples from 'monarchic despotism'. However, Italian and German nation states were created not by Italian and German versions of the French Jacobins but by conservative politicians Camilo Benso di Cavour and Otto von Bismarck, who realised the aims of the self-aggrandising dynastic power politics of the Sardinian Savoy and Prussian Hohenzollern dynasties.

The ultimate cause for the demise of Communism was the failure to deliver on the promise to accelerate economic progress and the social development of countries where Communist parties had

established their rule. Measuring the performance of post-communist regimes by the same yardsticks that Communist regimes applied to themselves allows us to find out whether the allegedly doomed capitalist system, after its restoration, was able to perform better on these promises. The description of restoration as 'rehabilitation' refers only to their intent to improve economic growth and human development but leaves open the question of its success. Like ecological or architectural restorations, social restoration can fail. Whether this in fact happened in specific cases can only be established by conducting empirical research, and the main aim of my outline of the theory of social restorations is to generate new, interesting questions for this research.

Assessing the success of modern social restorations by measuring and comparing the contribution of modern revolutions and modern restorations towards the increase of human wellbeing, I will only take modern revolutions on their own terms. Both the 'bourgeois' revolutions, directly (by revolution export) and indirectly (by example) ignited by the Great French Revolution, and the 'socialist' revolutions, sparked by the Great Russian Revolution, were humanist revolutions according to their ideology. The protagonists of both revolutions aspired to emancipate all of humankind, including its emancipation from material destitution, which implied hunger and premature death (cp. Fogel 2004). Very differently, pre-modern social upheavals, retrospectively described as revolutions, did not make any such humanist promises.

Therefore, the evaluation of modern restoration success should be based on the philosophy of humanism, considering the increase of human wellbeing as the ultimate guideline for assessment of the quality of social systems. This philosophy underlies the ideology of both great modern revolutions. By selecting the increase of economic output, improvement in the life conditions of newly born human beings to grow tall, and increase in life expectancy, I simply hold these revolutions to their promises. Of course, there is more that goes into human wellbeing than just economic and biological standards of living. Important reasons to select these criteria are cross-time and cross-country data comparability as well as availability of this data.

In this approach, the progressiveness or regression of modern revolutions and modern restorations becomes a problem in social measurement. A modern revolution proves its progressiveness by accelerating economic growth and improvement in the biological standard of life. Modern restorations should be evaluated on the same terms. They prove their progressiveness by accelerating the increase of human wellbeing compared to social systems spawned by revolutions. However, complete proof of progress should also include acceleration in comparison with the original or pre-revolutionary system.

Outperforming only the post-revolutionary system is not sufficient because restoration executors are preoccupied with preempting the recurrence of new revolutions. This may be achieved not by reversing all additions made during the intermediate period and restoring the missing parts of the original system with their exact historical replica (mimicking architectural restorations), but by constructing an improved version of the reference system. The proof of success of this kind of improvement is the superior performance of restored system C in comparison with the reference or original system. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the preceding argument, illustrated by examples that are discussed in the appropriate chapters of this book.

	Performance of C ('thick' or performance success)		
	Superior to A or B		Below that of A or B
Duration of C ('thin' or endurance success)	Longer than A or B	Enduring economically or socially progressive restorations	Enduring economically or socially regressive restorations ?
	Shorter than A or B	Failed economically or socially progressive restorations	Failed economically or socially regressive restorations

Table 1.2 Duration and performance of restored system (C) as dimensions of the evaluation of the success of modern social macro-restorations.

The establishment of progressiveness of restored system C with respect to A and B makes a major difference in evaluating the success of social restorations in comparison with that of architectural and ecological restorations. When it comes to architecture, a restored work of art cannot surpass the original in terms of its value (only Viollet-le-Duc with his idea of stylistic restoration was of a different opinion). A restored ecosystem may occasionally be more productive (producing more biomass) than the reference system. This may be sufficient to attest the success of the rehabilitation of an ecosystem. For the success of restorations, experts in ecological restoration consider superior productivity of the restored ecosystem as irrelevant, focusing on the increased biodiversity, similarity to the reference system (historical fidelity) and resilience as the most important issues.

Indeed, the right to life precedes all other human rights in all 'great' ideological documents of modern revolutions, starting with the the US Declaration of Independence (1776) and ending with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), with avoidable death from hunger and illness being the most blatant violation of this most basic human right. John Komlos and Brian Snowdon (2005: 125) provide illumination on this point:

> The extent to which a socio-economic system can provide an environment (broadly conceived) propitious to the growth of the human organism, for its healthy development, so that that organism can reach its biological growth potential, is arguably a useful indicator of the humanistic nature of that system. This perspective emphasizes that human beings are sentient, and that there is a human right to health.

I believe that the use of quantitative measures of economic growth and human development for assessment of the success of rehabilitation and restorations perfectly neutralise the bias favouring the pre-revolutionary system, which may be imported by borrowing templates from cultural heritage management and restoration ecology or by adapting restoration success criteria used in these fields. The sole, recurrent normative concern common to the restoration of cultural artefacts, ecosystems and social systems is their resilience against new decay (for cultural artefacts), degradation (for ecosystems) or the recurrence of revolutions (for social macro-systems). What is special about modern restorations is that they ensure their durability by implementing the agenda of modern revolutions in a more efficient way than the regimes created by revolutions and original systems (ancient regimes), which undermined themselves through their under-performance.

Therefore, the measure of restoration success is not the increase in similarity between the restored and original systems, but the capability of the restored system to outlive at least the intermediate social system. Efforts to increase the similarity between restored and original systems can be dysfunctional for achievement of this aim. In fact, many historians consider the efforts of Charles X Bourbon, who in 1824 succeeded Louis XVIII, as main cause of the July 1830.

3. Are Post-Socialist Capitalist Rehabilitations and Restorations Economically Progressive (=Performance Successful)?

The picture of economic and human welbeing performance of restored states and regimes after the fall of Napoleonic empire is ambiguous or bleak. The ambiguity is related to possible difference in economic and social impact of French revolution on its homeland and neighbour countries, which were targets of its export. As „sister republics" and then parts of Napoleonic empire, they were ruthlessly exploited by homeland of revolution and then metropole of continental empire. The result was absolute economic and social regress, meaning the decline of standard of life below pre-revolutionary levels. In the metropole of empire itself, the decline during revolutionary decade was followed by recovery growth under Napoleon, which could for very brief time to go beyond pre-

revolutionary levels. However, available data allow claim only relative health progress in comparison with pre-revolutionary level. We should wait for findings of further research on economic output of France in 1799-1812 and height of Frenchmen born in 1800-09.

It looks like (generalizing its failure to increase life expectancy) that France under restored Bourbon regime was not able to accelerate in comparison with Napoleon‘s time and so to achieve relative progress in economy, although there could be such achievement in comparison with ancient regime. In the former peripheries of Napoleon‘s empire, the liberation from French yoke did bring positive instead of negative economic growth. This was economic progress, which was accompanied also by rise of biological standard of life. However, except for Germany, by 1850 former French „sister republics“ did not economically progress beyond the top output per capita levels achieved in the 18th century. Both failures indeed both explain and validate the received perception of restoration time as that of lack of progress and reaction, which contaminate the very meaning „restoration“ until now.

Economic stagnation and decline in the biological life in the former peripheries of Napoleon‘s empire in the 1830s and 1840s (after brief recovery period following their liberation from the French yoke) was related to protracted *de facto* British monopoly over technologies of First industrial revolution, based on steam-powered machine production (Allen 2009; Trebilcock 1981). During this period, British industry was able to outcompete traditional handicrafts and industries, based on manual work in the continental Europe, exposing them to threat of deindustrialization after the example of Indian Bengal, which before British industrialization thrived on handicraft textile industries, working for European markets (Riello and Parthasarathi 2011).

Paradoxically, economic growth of the U.K. and its domination on world markets in 1815-70 was accompanied by absolute social regress in the Britain itself, indicated by the decline in the biological standard of life. In Britain, there was protracted depression in 1815-20 because of deflationary policies of British government, and then the recovery was interrupted by the devastating 1825 economic crisis (Hilton 1977). Then economic conjuncture improved and so British GDPpc did grow in 1815-48 by 25% and by 67% in 1815-1870 (1815=100%) with annual 0,68% growth rate in 1815-48, and 1,33% in 1848-70 (cp. Table 4.1). However, during five decades of British technological and economic world domination in 1810-69 (Broadberrry and O’Rourke 2010, 1) the heights of British males decreased from 169,7 cm in 1800-09 until 166,6 cm in 1860-69. Remarkably, recovery was slow: the 1800-09 level was surpassed only in 1900-10, some hundred year after first industrial revolution. This pattern of decreasing biological standard of life under formidable economic growth is characteristic also for Germany as most economically successful restoration country, and also for the U.S..

In the economic history, this correlation failure between economic growth and increase in the biological standard of life is (in)famous as “antebellum paradox”, referring to the decline of the height Americans in the decades before the U.S. Civil war (1861-1865) under conditions of rapid economic growth (Komlos 1995a; Steckel 1995). While males born in 1820-1829 were 173,5 cm tall, the height of their compatriots born in 1890-99 was 169,1 cm, all intermediate cohorts displaying continuous height decrease, while the U.S. GDPpc did increase more than two times in 1830-90. Only after 100 years, the Americans born in 1941-49 did outgrowth great-grandfathers. Although there was no decline in the life expectancy values of both countries in 1815-70, they did stagnate both in the U.K. and U.S. around 40-41 years (both sexes) level for more than five decades, starting to display sustained growth trend only since 1870 (Chesnais 2001).

The paradoxical conjunction of economic growth, making U.K. richest and most powerful country of the world, and the decrease of wellbeing of the expanding working class did not escape attention of critical contemporaries. One of two friend inventors of the most influential modern ideological

creed of 20th century Friedrich Engels was converted to socialism by personal ethnographic observations of this paradox in Manchester, which was one of the epicentres of industrial revolution (Engels 1998 (1845). Arguably, the deepest source of modern socialism was concern with this paradox. Karl Marx believed until end of his life that economic growth under capitalism cannot go on without increasing not only relative, but also absolute impoverishment of proletariat, which finds its most palpable manifestation in the declining biological standard of life. His early followers did believe that only socialist revolution can resolve this paradox by abolishing private property over modern industrial means of production. Marxist expectation was that their socialization will both enormously accelerate the growth of production forces and will ensure radically egalitarian distribution of the output, making possible universal human flourishing and self-realization (Wright 1997).

Contemporary economic historians do not agree to put the responsibility for decline biological standard life during early 19th century industrialization only at capitalism‘s door. Instead, they refer to rapid urbanization, exposing urban population to virulent disease environment. Under inadequate sanitation and public health, better nourished but highly concentrated urban population suffered under increased infection burden (Szreter 1997). They were plagued only by old (endemic) infectious diseases, but also from new infections, brought from distant countries by transport revolution, making possible rapid movement of large number of people over long distances.

Although their total calories intake increased, members of swelling urban working class lost advantages of proximity to animal husbandry, enjoyed by rural populations with more protein-rich diets (cp. Grasgruber et al. 2016). Offal and milk, which was consumed even by rural poor and by their offspring, was too expensive for many workers in large cities in the pre-refrigerator era. Differently from poor peasants or agricultural workers, who produced part of their food themselves or received their salaries in kind, urban industry workers suffered from fluctuations of their monetary wages and food prices, exacerbated by the economic conjuncture cycles. As a result, large numbers of children grew up stunted under increased physiological stress (Komlos 1995a; 1995b; Steckel 1995; Komlos and Baten 2004).

Inequality in the distribution of wealth and income is another factor, explaining repeatedly occurring positive correlation failures between GDP growth and mean height changes (Deaton 2013; Komlos and Baur 2014). Greater relative inequality deprives the members of lower socioeconomic strata of good nutrition and medical care, reducing longevity of the adults and stunting their children. As a matter of common knowledge, industrialization of Western countries in 19th century was accompanied by rising inequality, which in the next century was replaced for some time by the opposite trend in the 20th century (Kuznets 1966; 1971; Piketty 2014). Expanding welfare state promoted the welfare of children from lower strata, securing for them the micro-environments where they could growth as tall as their peers from middle and higher classes.

Welfare state did rise only in 20th century, while in late 19th century there were only its very modest beginnings in few countries (Lindert 2004). Even in the 20th century its advancement was very uneven across different Western countries (Piketty 2020). Socialist ideology and socialist parties were and remain its most persistent promoters (Eley 2002; Hobsbawm 1994). By the time of Marx death (1883), sharpest socialist observers did already take the notice that the absolute impoverishment of the working class in the industrial countries does not take the place. Briefly after Engels death (1895), Marxian socialism did split into revisionist and revolutionary currents. Revisionists claimed that workers wellbeing can be further improved without socialist revolution (Eley 2002).

Exponents of revolutionary Marxism insisted that socialist revolution remains necessity. They explained improving wellbeing of larger part of working class in the industrial countries by economic exploitation of peripheries of the Capitalist World System (CWS), enabling capitalists in its core

states to bribe metropolitan working class (or at least its most skilled and politically active part, called "workers aristocracy"). However, the rivalry over control of these peripheries leads to recurring world wars, with drafted workers of great powers killing each other in masses. To abolish this evil last revolutionary world war or socialist world revolution is necessary, which will start as transformation of ordinary imperialist world war (for redistribution of colonies and spheres of influence at the periphery of CWS) into the socialist world revolution (Lenin 2008 (1917)).

Russian Bolsheviks did attempt such transformation after taking power in 1917, but failed even to establish their control over complete territory of Russian empire. However, ruling what was diminished (until 1939) and then expanded (after 1945) Russian empire, they only could legitimate their rule in the eyes of its metropolitan Russian population only accelerating its economic and human wellbeing progress in comparison with Russian empire. In the Soviet statistics, 1913 was usual base year for evaluation of real or only claimed achievements of Soviet government (Jasny 1962). Another way of self-legitimation was to argue that state socialist system enables countries with such systems to permanently stable economic growth rates superior over those of capitalist system. Thanks to higher growth rates, they should become richer than most advanced capitalist countries in only a short time.

The concern of rulers of Soviet empire with superior rates of economic growth did become paramount after Stalin's death in 1953. In the early 1960s, under impression of the really high growth rates of Soviet Union in 1950s, Soviet leadership (Nikita Khruschev) claimed that socialist countries will beat capitalist countries in the peaceful competition just by achieving higher levels of wellbeing than in most advanced capitalist countries. In the III Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), adopted in October 1961 at its XXII Congress, building of communism was operationally defined as „catching up and overtaking U.S." by 1970 or by 1980 at the very latest. „The national income of the USSR in the next ten years will increase by nearly 150 per cent, and by about 400 per cent in twenty years" (Programme of CPSU 1961: 84-85).

According to Soviet planners, in 1980 the total industrial output would have exceeded overall US industrial output „by not less than 500 per cent", labour productivity – by „roughly 100 per cent" (Programme of CPSU 1961: 64), and already in 1970 the USSR would have outstripped the US „in output of the key agricultural products per head of population" Programme of CPSU 1961:72). Overtaking of the U.S. would herald the definitive victory of socialism in the „peaceful competition of two systems", proving the superiority of socialism as system of production and innovation even in the eyes of populations in the developed capitalist countries, not to speak about the billions of people living in the former Western colonies and semi-colonies.

Therefore, assessing success of post-communist restorations of capitalism by comparing output capita growth rates during post-communist period and that during late communist period of similar duration I am just taking by their words Lenin and other masterminds of the world socialist revolution, which did degenerate to the "construction of socialism in one country". I am taking by their words also rulers of this country, who used WWII to export its political economic model abroad. According to these words, the first promise of socialist revolution was to liberate working class from actual (in peripheries of the CWS) or only imminent (in its core) absolute impoverishment, providing opportunities for human flourishing, available only to minority of exploiters (and „workers aristocracy") under capitalism, for all toiling people. Further promise was to make these countries more affluent than all those still remaining under bourgeois rule. This made world top levels of the economic output and living standard as most obvious, even if only minimal distinguishing feature, of the successful socialism (Pons 2014).

When intellectuals and political leader of countries Third world occasionally converted to Marxism-Leninism, this happened because they looked for most efficacious development strategy

how to overcome the development gap behind their former Western colonial metropoles. The were fascinated by the promise of „really existing socialism“ to outcompete economically and in terms of human wellbeing even most advanced capitalist countries (Engerman 2011; Hough 1986; Sanchez-Sibony 2015; Westad 2005) in brief time. This promise also did help Communist rule to get some acceptance or legitimacy during its first decades in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1994).

Iván Berend (1996; 1998; 2006) warned against simplifying the interpretation of the state socialist episode in the history of Central European countries as merely foreign imposition. „The communist experiment was part of a twentieth century rebellion of the unsuccessful peripheries, which were humiliated by economic backwardness and the increasing gap separating them from the advanced Western core" (Berend 1996: X). The export of „French model“ by Directory and then Napoleon could rely on the support of small but important minorities of local *afranchesados,* who did congratulate new institutions as blessing, which will bring prosperity to their countries in the longer run, after breaking the resistance of superstitious common people. Similarly, Moscow would not have suceeded to install Stalinist centrally planned economic model in the Eastern Europoean countries without support of local educated and semi-educated minorities, defining themselves as „intelligentsia“ and mass converted (for some time) to Marxist credo (cp. Eyal et al. 1998)..

According to Berend‘s account, there were two revolts against the West in the Eastern Europe during the past century: a right wing rebellion against democracy after WWI, and left-wing rebellion against liberal democracy and capitalism after WWII. The promise of the socialism was that it will deliver what capitalist development did fail to achieve by 1939: to close the economic and human and development gap, separating Western and Eastern parts of European continent (see also Kaser and Radice 1985; 1986a; 1986b). And so Berend (1996; 1998) tells the economic history of Eastern European countries in 1944–1993 as futile „detour from the periphery to the periphery“, meaning that after some five decades of socialist development they did arrive to the same structural position in the CWS, from which they did attempt to escape. But surely this is only retrospective wisdom, because in 1950s Soviet industrialization still was broadly preceived as big success and recommended (under euphemistic designation of „big push“ model) as sure recipe how to break out of „poverty trap“ for Third World countries (cp. Rosenstein-Rodan 1943).

Soviet empire surely would not have dissolved, had the USSR fulfilled the promise to catch up with U.S. – even if this would have happened only in 1990 or in 2000, and not in 1970 or 1980 (as was promised). In fact, already in late 1960s the promise of catching and overtaking U.S. was only a standing joke even in the USSR. Instead of celebration of the Soviet catching up with U.S., the year 1980 witnessed the birth of *Solidarność* movement in Gdańsk, leading to the first victorious anti-communist restoration in Poland in 1989. However, at least one country under Communist rule managed to increase its national income by more than 400% in only twenty years. It was not USSR but China (in 1990-2010), and this may main cause why this country still remains under the grip of Communist government.

Blatant failure to deliver on its all-to-specific promises, which were unabashedly populist, was just all-to-obvious cause of the crisis and demise of the socialism of Soviet type. Instead of remaining on the nearly two-digit level of the 1950s, Soviet annual growth rates gradually decreased in the 1970s and 1980s. Gorbachev reforms were motivated by the perception of the stagnation of Soviet economy and did aim to accelerate its development again, enabling reformed really existing socialism to ultimately deliver on its promise to close the development gap, still separating Soviet Union and its satellites from advanced Western countries after some 60 (in the case of Soviet Union) or 40 (in the case of satellites) years of socialist development (Miller 2016).

Reforms of really existing socialism ended with restoration of capitalism. Opponents of reformist communists (usually formerly reformist Communist themselves) in 1989-1991, who pleaded for restoration of capitalism (or just "normal market economy") believed or did managed to persuade post-communist electorates that restored "old good capitalism" will bring about what socialism failed to deliver: will close the economic and human development gap, rapidly raising output and wellbeing levels to the advanced Western marks and standards (Bockman 2011).

The last sentence of the III CPSU Programme was: „the party solemny proclaims: the present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism!" (Programme of CPSU 1961: 128). The popular belief during the time of „extraordinary politics" (Balcerowicz 1995: 265–273) in the early 1990s, which helped to endure the hardships of „shock therapy", was that market reforms will turn former post-communist countries into rich countries such as those in Western Europe and U.S. even in a shorter time than the span of life of single generation. Even if this promise was populist like the promises of the Soviet Communist Party Prime Secretary Nikita Khruschev 1961, the comparison of late communist and post-communist performance in economic and human development seems most reasonable way to assess the success of post-communist transformation.

So cross-time comparison of growth performance of socialist and restored capitalist systems pays justice also to the promises of the opponents of Communists during the time of terminal crisis of communism (1989-1991) and transitional "extraordinary politics". I am paying also last hommage to ill-fated reformer of socialism Mikhail Gorbachev, who did attempt to save it by his policies of acceleration (actually, his „perestroika" was conceived only as means to this aim). Gorbachevean acceleration did fail together with perestroika, and Russians did hopefully embrace radical market reforms or just capitalist restoration, expecting that they will bring about the acceleration of economic growth and rise in the standard of life.

But did in fact restoration of capitalism did accelerate economic growth in comparison with state socialism? And is the growth performance of restored capitalism any better in comparison with that of the original capitalism (if yes, this also means acceleration)? In fact, restoration of capitalism can hardly deem as economically progressive, if growth rates under restored private property based market economy did remain below those achieved under state socialism or original capitalist economy. The CREPS just provides formulaic expression of this idea:

CREPS (Criterion of the restoration economic performance success): ***Restored social system C is economically progressive, if growth of the output per capita in C accelerates in comparison with intermediate system B and original system A.***

The acceleration of economic growth in the restored system in comparison with its immediate antecedent is necessary just to prove its economic superiority. Acceleration in comparison with the original system is necessary to prove that restoration is not just a return of the past system, which already succumbed to revolution once, but is the creation of its improved version. The economic success of restoration is complete if C accelerates in respect to both A and B. In the case of partial success, C accelerates only with respect to B or C. Application of this criterion (the same holds for the next two) involves two tests: the outperforming intermediate system test (OIST) and the outperforming original system test (OOST). The failure to pass the OIST is more painful because it means that systemic change did not rehabilitate B economically.

It can be argued that lack of relative and even absolute economic progress can be compensated. Even in those few post-communist countries where GDP per capita remains by 2020 below its 1989 or 1990 level (e.g. Moldova, see Tab.4.4), domestic consumers benefited a lot from the more product variety and increased quality because of the greater access to imports. Enterprising people received opportunity to start business and try their entrepreneurial talents, the artistic people – to express

themselves freely in the public, and everybody (with the exception for politicians and businessmen who occasionally could become targets of the U.S. or EU sanctions) is now free to travel abroad. In the countries where democracies were restored or installed for first time, lack of economic progress could be compensated by the right to vote or freedom to run for elected public office (e.g., that of state president). But probably this is not a kind of compensation which all-too-many losers of capitalist restoration (Havrylysyn 2006) would be glad to accept remembering promises of the „extraordinary politics“ time.

Assuming the GDPpc increase as valid measure of economic progress, and conceiving relative economic progress as growth acceleration, deceleration of economic growth is just relative economic regress. It should be distingushed from absolute economic regress, indicated by decrease of the GDPpc. Both relative and absolute economic regress can be complicated by increase in the income inequality (which is also general trend under capitalist rehabilitation (Heyns 2005; see also Piketty 2014; 2020). However, growth acceleration or relative economic progress can make decrease of income equality under restored capitalism more tolerable and even justify it as ist own price.

The measurement of economic performance success of capitalist restoration is application of the OIST and OOST to data on economic growth. So the remaining part of this chapter provides the discussion of economic performance success of capitalist rehabilitations and restorations of formerly centrally planned economies, based on CREPS and AST, using the MPD 2020 data. In the next two chapters, it will be expanded by the discussion of somatic and health performance success of capitalist rehabilitations. Table 2 provides excerpt of relevant data on the GDPpc of most formerly Communist countries and the U.S., which is used as benchmark country for application of the AST. They are provided in the 2011 international $ and in % of the U.S. GDPpc size to measure the convergence with this beacon of world capitalism.

Country	1885	1888	1909	1913	1922	1929	1938	1960	1973	1989	2008	2018	Minimal target value according to OIST 2040
United States	6 424	6 447	9 798	10 108	10 010	11 954	10 526	18 057	26 602	36 756	50 276	55 335	Na
Soviet Union	1 379 (21,47%)	1 490 (23,11%)	2 015 (20,56%)	2 254 (22,23%)	974 (9,73%)	2 209 (22,06%)	3 427 (32,56%)	6 288 34,8%	9 658 36,30%	11 336 30,08%	16 227 (32,28%)	19 539 (35,31)	Na
Albania				1 293 (12,79%)		1 476 (12,35%)		2 313 (12,8%)	3 623 (13,62%)	3 948 (10,74%)	8 522 (16,95%)	11 104 (20.07%)	Nd
Armenia									9 806 (36,86%)	10 525 28,63%	10 081 (20,05%)	11 454 (20,7%)	Nd
Azerbaijan									7 068 (26,57%)	8 421 (22,91%)	14 073 27,99%	16 628 30,0%	Nd
Belarus									8 341 (31,35%)	11 893 (32,36%)	16 224 (32,27%)	18 727 (33,84%)	Nd
Bosnia and Herzegovina								2 871 (15,90%)	4 801 (18,05%)	6 711 (18,26%)	9 199 (18,30%)	10 461 (18,90%)	Nd
Bulgaria						1 956 (16,36%)	2 389 (22,70%)	4 642 25,7%	8 423 31,66%	9 908 (26,96%)	14 762 (29,36%)	18 444 (33,33%)	41 124
Croatia								5 067 (28,06%)	9 969 37,26%	13 959 (37,97%)	20 717 41,21%	22 012 39,78%	Nd
Czechia								8 142 (45,09%)	10 026 (37,68%)	14 027 (38,16%)	26 186 (52,08%)	30 749 (55,57%)	41 715 Derived from Czechoslovakia 1937-89
Czechoslovakia		2399 (1890) (37,21%)	3174 (1910) (32,39%)	3 341 (33,05%)	3 198 (31,95%)	4 849 (40,5%)	4594 (1937) 43,6%	8 142 (45,09%)	11 223 (42,19%)	13 976 (38,02%)	24 257 (48,25%)	29 601 (53,49%)	41 563
Estonia				**3 341 (33,05%)**	**2 470 (24,67%)**	**3 234 (27,05%)**	**4 068 (38,66)**	9691 (53,67%)	13 799 (51,87%)	15473 (42,10%)	26178 (2007) (48,59%)	27 409 (49,53%)	60 210
Georgia									9 456 (35,54%)	14 161 (38,53%)	8 462 (16,82%)	11 985 (21,66%)	Nd
Hungary				3 344 (33,08%)		3 947 (33,01%)	4 232 (40,20%)	5 816 32,21%	8 920 (33,53%)	11 003 (29,93%)	20 381 (40,54%)	25 623 (46,30%)	28 590
Kazakhstan									12 154 (45,69%)	12 153 (33,06%)	18 666 (37,12%)	25 308 45,74%	Nd
Kyrgyzstan									5 941 (22,20%)	5 719 (15,56%)	4 047 (8,05%)	5 177 (9,36%)	Nd

Latvia				**3 834 (37,93%)**	**2 964 (29,61%)**	**3 766 (31,50%)**	**4 527 (43,05)**		12 506 (46,74%)	15 661 42,96%	21 042 (2007) (40,46%)	24 313 43,94%	54 087
Lithuania				**2 650 (26,21%)**	**2 595 (25,92%)**	**2 620 ()21,91%**	**3 619 (34,38%)**		12 103 (45,23%)	14 693 (39,97%)	20 880 (41,53%)	27 371 (49,46%)	59 787
Moldova									8 552 (31,96%)	10 288 (27,99%)	4 652 (9,25%)	6 747 12,19%	Nd
Mongolia								912 (5,05%)	1 328 (3,61%)	2 232 (6,07%)	6 982 (13,89%)	13 383 (24,19%)	Nd
Montenegro								2 439 (13,5%)	5 137 (19,20%)	7 278 (19,8%)	13 550 (26,95%)	19 504 (35,25%)	Nd
North Macedonia								3 586 (19,86%)	7 471 (27,92%)	10 206 (27,77%)	10 674 (21,23%)	13 074 (23,63%)	Nd
Poland	2 083 (32,42%)	2120 (32,88%)		2 772 (27,42%)		3 374 (28,22%)	3 478 (33,04%)	5 125 (28,38%)	8 512 32,00%	9 060 (24,65%)	19 012 (37,82%)	27 455 (49,62%)	23 660
Romania	528 (8,22%)	564 (8,75%)	617 (6,30%)	767 (7,59%)	561 (5,60%)	681 (5,70%)	701 (6,66%)	1 605 (8,67%)	4 318 (16.23%)	5 942 (14,19%)	16 347 (32,51%)	20 126 (36,37%)	50 371
Russia	1 379 (21,47%)	1 490 (23,11%)	2 015 (20,56%)	2 254 (22,23%)	974 (9,73%)	2 209 (22,06%)	3 427 (32,56%)	5 557 (30,77%)	10 492 (39,44%)	12 766 (34,73%)	21 563 (42,89%)	24 669 (44,58%)	61 465 (2050) 47504 (2040)
Serbia								3 948 (21,86%)	7 716 (28,83%)	10 963 (29,83%)	11 650 (23,17%)	14 124 (25,52%)	Nd
Slovakia										12 734 (34,64%)	22 232 (44,22%)	27 076 (48,93%)	37 870 Derived from Czechoslovakia 1937-89
Slovenia								7 165 (39,68%)	15 079 (56,35%)	19 837 (53,97%)	28 474 (56,63%)	29 245 (52,85%)	Nd
Tajikistan									6 527 (24,39%)	4 962 (13,50%)	2 802 (5,57%)	4 440 (8,02%)	Nd
Turkmenistan									7 693 (28,75%)	5 915 (16,09%)	12 427 (24,72%)	26 318 (47,56%)	Nd
Ukraine									7 849 (29,34%)	10 082 (27,43%)	10 824 (21,53%)	9 813 (17,73%)	Nd
Uzbekistan									8 125 (30,37%)	7 093 (19,30%)	6 278 (12,49%)	11 220 (20,28%)	Nd
Yugoslavia				1 551 (15,34%)	1 551 (15,49%)	2 002 (16,74%)	1 991 (18,92%)	3 778 (20,92%)	7 226 (27,01%)	9 887 (26,90%)	13 125 (26,11%)	16 558 (29,92%)	Na

Table 2. GDPpc of formerly Communist countries and U.S. 1885-2018 in 2011 int$ and % % of the U.S. level (figures in brackets). For Estonia and Latvia, which were early victims of Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008, the % % of the U.S. level in 2007 (50 902 2011 int$) are provided. Source: MPD 2020, own estimates (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1913-38; in bold). See also 6.1

Data availability imposes severe restrictions on temporal range and number of cases (countries) for which both tests can be applied. As a matter of principle, for countries with no capitalist past, only OIST can be applied, assessing in this way economic performance success of capitalist transformation of their economies. But even if comparison of growth performance of post-communist capitalist Uzbekistan with pre-capitalist Uzbekistan would make sense, it would not be possible practically, because first data point on Uzbekistan in MPD 2020 refers to 1973.

The same applies to other fSU republics except for Russian Federation and Baltic countries. For Russian Federation, MPD 2020 provides data since 1960. On interwar Baltic countries, I am using own estimates, which are presented and discussed in detail in the 6th part of the book. MPD 2020 provides data also for defunct states USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. This data is used to extend backwards time series of Russia. Such use can be validated by the domination of Russian metropole in the USSR and Russian empire in terms of its share of population and territory. However, such approach can be applied only with caution using Czechoslovakian data series to extend backwards time series of Slovak (starting with 1985) and Czech (1970) Republics. Data series for former republics of Yugoslavia start with 1952, but it would be inconsiderate to extend them backwards using interwar Yugoslavia‘s GDPpc values because economic disparities between Yugoslavian republics were much larger than of differences between Czechia and Slovakia.

For all countries included, data time series ends with 2018. This imposes as window of comparison of 29 years since 1989, which is commonly accepted data of the collapse of Soviet empire, although its internal part (USSR) did survive for next two years. There are differences in the timing of the start of market reforms across Communist countries, already discussed in the chapter 3.3. In Central and Eastern European countries (except for Albania), they started already in 1990, while in the fSU republics they received the impetus only after the dissolution of the USSR. Yeltsin‘s main reason to dissolve USSR was economical and political impossibility for Russia to launch radical market reforms until Russia remained part of what suddenly became Soviet confederation, because after the failure of August coup all important decisions in the ailing USSR needed consent of all Soviet union republics (Plokhy 2014). These differences in timing are important calculating the year of ultimate success of capitalist rehabilitations and restorations according to CRES.

However, the use of dates of starting radical market reforms as limit points of time windows to assess economic performance success of capitalist restoration would lead astray. In most Eastern and Central European countries the year of the political collapse of Communism in 1989 was also the year of top economic level achieved under socialism. In the fSU republics, by 1992 GDPpc was much below of top Soviet achievement. So the choice of 1992 as baseline would lead to underestimation of their growth performance during the Soviet period and net economic growth under capitalist rehabilitation. Because of Napoleon‘s Hundred Days, there are similar difficulties also in timing of restoration era, which can be dated both since 1814 and 1815. This may matter a lot, assessing economic performance success of Bourbon restoration, but under present state of research output data are missing for both years. Therefore, assessing performance success of capitalist rehabilitations and restorations, for all formerly countries 1989 is used as boundary between two epochs.

Ideally, application of the OIST would involve comparison of annual compound growth rates in 1989-2018 and 1960-89. With no data on fSU republics (except Russian Federation), only 1973-1989 and 1989-2005 period can be compared. However, the choice of 1989-2005 period for comparison with 1973-89 just because of equal duration would be mindlessly arithmetical approach. First years of post-communist period was time of deep structural reforms, involving liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and (most importantly) privatization, which did change the very character of the economic system, making it capitalist (again). The masterminds of capitalist restoration did expect the output decline for time of most intense reforms, asking population for

patience and waiting allowance until market reforms will start to deliver the fruits (Gaidar 2012; Service 2009b).

The use for the evaluation of the early performance success of market reforms of 1973-1989 and 1989-2008 periods gives justice to this complex situation, by adding to restored capitalist period three years (2005-08) of rapid growth, interrupted by the Great Recession in 2008-11. In the U.S. and some other countries thus recesssion did begin already in 2007. However, in most post-communist countries the growth continued in 2008. Exceptions are Estonia and Latvia, which did belong to early victims of the Great Recessions. Therefore, for them 1973-89 and 1989-2007 periods are compared. The comparison of 1973-1989 and 1989-2008 or 1989-2007 periods allows both late intermediate socialist and early restored capitalist systems appear at their best and ensures cross-country synchronization of the comparison windows.

As a matter of principle, temporal delimitation of the comparison units (periods) should not be guided by purely arithmetic consideration of the strict chronological equality of both periods. Instead, real historical periods should be compared, with historical time punctuated into meaningful temporal wholes by important historical events and changes (Haydu 2010). Such events are major wars or economic crises, which are of major importance for the growth dynamics of capitalist economies. State socialist period also was not of a piece, but contained subperiods differing in terms of growth dynamics. 1950s are reputed as best decade in the economic history of socialism (Hanson 2003; Khanin 2008). In 1960s their growth was already slowing down, and so start of socialist comparison period with 1960 is reasonable.

After the suppression of "Prague spring" in 1968, in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries the conservative turn took place, marked by the ceasing of the reform attempts (Service 2009; Zubok 2007). Only Hungary was allowed by Moscow to continue its experiment with "new economic model", started in 1968. This was the attempt to transform Stalinist centrally administrated system into a kind of market socialism. However, this transformation did not progress further than the levels of marketization already achieved in the neighbour Yugoslavia, where conservative turn did take place too only two years later. It was marked by the suppression of the "Croatian spring" in 1971 (Tanner 1997), which was Yugoslavian parallel to what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. So the comparison of growth performance in 1973-89 and 1989-2008 is substantively sensible for all former Communist countries, even if in the case of the fSU republics the choice of 1973-89 period is imposed by data availability.

Similar reasoning applies to selection of comparison periods for application of the OOST. Following strictly numerical approach, the 1989-2018 period should be compared with 1921-1948, because 1948 is the year when Communists did launch final anti-market reforms in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. In Albania and Yugoslavia this happened already in 1944-45, because local Communists were strong enough to seize power without the decisive contribution of Red Army and were not bounded by tactical political alliances with „bourgeois powers", which Stalin did advice to Communist parties during the transition to the Cold War. So by purely numerical approach, 29 years of postcommunist economic growth in 1989-2018 should be compared with 1916-1945 period in Albania and formerly republics of Yugoslavia.

Rather obviously, last comparison makes no sense, even if necessary statistical data would be available. Economy of Yugoslavia in 1945 was in shambles after four years of heavy war fighting. The same applies to economies of the lands, which were united into Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians in the 1918, but still were parts of Habsburg empire or under its military occupation in 1916. Comparison of post-communist era 1989-2018 with 1913-1938 period makes most sense, because it allows to maximize the number of countries encompassed and to connect to mainstream economic history. Here we find the firmly established convention to use 1913 as base year to assess

the economic progress of European countries in the interwar time. This convention is based on broad consensus among experts in economic history that the 1913-38 period is substantively self-contained period in the economic history, limited by the events which are not just arbitrarily chosen time points, but real breaks in the world historical time (e.g. Aldcroft 1995; Broadberry and O'Rourke 2010; Berend 1998; Turnock 1997).

As important, although minor argument in favour of comparing 1913-1938 and 1989-2018 period is that they are of rather similar duration and display sequence similarities, starting with subperiods of the output contraction. Although causes are different (there was no war in the early post-communist Europe, except for Yugoslavia), they partly overlap, because Eastern European economies suffered in 1914-1924 not only from war destruction, but because of the loss of usual markets in the wake of dissolution of Austro-Hungary and related changes in the state borders. In fact, the dissolution of Yugoslavia had the impact on economies of its constituent republics quite similar to that of dissolution of Austro-Hungary on the economies of its former parts (Barkey and Hagen 1997; Berglund and Aarebrot 1997). And the same was impact of loss of Soviet market for former satellite countries of Soviet empire, which was rather tighty economically integrated (Berend 1996; Kaser and Radice 1986b).

Loss of Russian market in 1989-1991 was no lesser challenge for economy of Poland after 1915 (defeated by Germans, Russia had to evacuate Poland in this year) than in 1989-92, because Russian part of partitioned Poland (Kingdom of Poland, 1815-1915) did became deeply integrated with Russian economy over one hundred years (Berend 1998; Kaser and Radice 1985; 1986a). So economies of Eastern European countries did recover to 1913 levels not earlier than by 1923-24, which stands again in rather close correspondence to duration of recovery period (some ten years) of many post-communist economies to 1989 GDPpc levels. Continuing the parallels, the shock of the Great Recession in 2009-2011 is comparable to that of Great Depression in 1929-1933, even if only to contrast completely diferent strategies of its management by governments during both periods.

Differently from Great Depression, when deflationary policies only exacerbated the crisis, during the Great Recessions Neo-Keynesian policies were used by most countries (except Baltic and Southern European countries) from the very beginning).[2] Therefore, the Great Recession did not become „the Ninth Wave" (depicted by Russian Armenian painter Ivan Aivazovsky) which destroyed democracy in those Eastern European countries where it did survive by 1929 (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2001; 2002). Indeed, post-communist period is longer by 4 years, but this is no obstacle for comparison of growth rates in 1913-38 and 1989-2018.

Although 1938 was not the last year of capitalist economic system in the Eastern Europe, war years (1939-1945) stand in greater continuity with socialist transformation since 1945 than with preceding period. During the war, markets were increasingly freezed or suspended, giving place to the encompassing state control and regulation of economy, which was not abolished in 1945. It was continued and used to mobilize resources for post-war reconstruction needs and then for socialist industrialization project. Introduction of central planning was just consummation of the creeping process, which was started before Communist takeover (Berend 1996; 2006).

As was already explained in 3.3, war and post-war time expropriations of Jewish, German, Italian (in Yugoslavia), Hungarian (in Czchoslovakia) minorities (Stan and Nedelsky 2013) just prefigured and anticipated the encompassing nationalization only few years later. In terms of theory of complex dynamic systems (Scheffer 2009), replacement of free market economy by state regulated market economy together with war and post-war expropriations of ethnic minorities did make the attraction

[2] I will compare in the part 6 the impact of both crises on Baltic countries in more detail.

bassin of capitalism much more narrow and shallow, reducing its resilience against the shift into the state socialist regime.

By persuading governments of post-Communist countries to move *status quo* dates for restitution of Jewish property from the time of Communist takeover to that of expropriations by authorities which were fiercely anti-Communist (Bazyler et al. 2019), the U.S. Department of State did admonish of the continuity between early Communist and late pre-Communist violations of the private property order, which is the linchpin of capitalism. Accepting this admonishment, proper date for the ultimate application of the OIST in the Eastern European countries is 2039, which will be 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which did open the gate for the westward export of Russian socialist revolution. It can be conveniently rounded to 2040, pandering the social scientists' mental habit to structure their data by decades.

Then the ultimate assessment of the economic performance success of capitalist restorations in Eastern Europe will involve comparison of annual growth rates in during 51 years of restoration era (1989-2040) and during 51 year of intermediate totalitarian era (1938-1989). The 1938 is preferable base year because by this time allows to include largest number of countries, although in this year only Hitler did pursue the expropriation of Jewish capitalists in Germany, Austria and Czechia, completed by Communist expropriation of all capitalists in 1948-49. Alternatively, growth rates during 41 years of state socialism (1948-89) can be compared with those 40 years under restored capitalism (1989-2030). The advantage of this option is lesser waiting time, and the shortcoming is lesser number of countries covered, because for many countries (most importantly, Baltic States) reliable estimates of their output per capita over 1948-89 hardly can be expected by 2030.

Comparison of growth rates during 1973-89 and 1989-2008 allows to assess early performance success of capitalist restoration. Comparison of 1960-89 and 1989-2018 periods informs about its actual performance success. Comparison of 1938-89 and 1989-2040 will tell about its ultimate performance success. At the time of the work on this book, it remains still some two decades to wait, and this is the reason why future tense is used in the title of this (and next two) chapters. To prove its relative economic progressivenes, restored capitalist system should ensure growth acceleration in 1989-2040 in comparison with 1938-1989. So for countries with known GDPpc values in 1938 and 1989, it is possible to derive minimal GDPpc target values which should be achieved by 2040-50. They are provided in the table 2 in the last column on the right. Hopefully, progress in the quantitative economic history will allow to significantly expand by 2040 the number of countries for which such derivation is possible.

To recall, MPD 2020 provides no data (except of Russian Federation since 1960) for provinces of Russian empire[3], later union and republics and then (after 1918 and 1991) independent states before 1973. This allows to rate actual economic performance success of capitalist restoration in Russia properly by comparing its growth 1960-89 and 1989-2018 on a par with Eastern European countries. However, the date of the ultimate judgment of the economic performance success of capitalist restoration in Russia will come by 10 years later (in 2049-50), because socialist era did start in Russia since 1929. The 1921-28 period is not included, because it was actually period of (first) capitalist restoration in Russia after the the brief period of „war communism" in 1918-20. Basing on the GDPpc values for USSR in 1929 and Russian Federation in 1989, annual growth value over 1929-89 period was 2,97% (see Tab.3), implying minimal target value of $73 909 int$ 2011 for 2049-50. To stand the OIST test, the type restored Russian capitalism should grow at not a lesser rate in 1989-2050.

[3] Actually, the data for Russia in 1913, 1924, and 1938 in MPD 2020 refer to the territory of former Soviet Union in 1990 borders.

In socialist countries with capitalist past, assessment of economic performance success of capitalist rehabilitation includes also comparison of growth rates under original capitalist system to check whether restoration of capitalism did include its improvement. This is application of the OOST. By 2020, the comparison of growth rates in 1913-38 and 1989-2018 can provide best basis of their actual performance success. By 2040, it would be appropriate to replicate this assessment by comparing growth rates during five post-communist decades and five decades before WWII (1888-1938). Under present state of research in the quantitative economic history, growth rates during last decades of 19th century are known only few countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland Romania, Bulgaria), but by 2040 situation will hopefully improve. My work provides the proposal of the aim, for which the findings of such research can be used.

In Russia, capitalist system did endure (1861-1929, 68 years) not much longer than socialist system (1929-92, 63 years). However, because of special character of Soviet NEP capitalism in 1921-28, proper choice of original capitalist system is 1861-1913 period, which did endure only 52 years. Then actual (by 2020s) performance success of Russian capitalist restoration should be evaluated by the OOST comparing economic growth performance in 1989-2018 and 1884-1913. This is possible, because Russian time series in MPD 2020 (based on Gregory 1982), starts with 1885. However, possibility of the ultimate judgment whether restored Russian capitalism was relatively economically progressive in comparison with original Rusian capitalism depends on the extension of Russian output series until 1861. If this will be done by 2041-44, which is the date when restored Russian capitalism will outlast its ancestor, the ultimate assessment of its economic performance success by the OOST will be accomplished before testing its performance success by the OIST.

For all other countries (with possible exceptions for Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia;) waiting period for ultimate application of OOST is longer than that for ultimate assessment of economic performance success of capitalist restoration by OIST. Proper time for such assessment in Estonia is 2116, when restored (in 1992) Estonian capitalism will outlast its pre-socialist ancestor (1816-1940). Hopefully, by this time quantitative economic history will proceed so far to provide reliable estimates of Estonia's output per capita in 1816 (which are already available for most Nordic countries). For Poland, where start of capitalist era can be counted since 1807, when Napoleon himself did abolish serfdom in this country, such data are available since 1399, with gap for 1800-10. Using 1811 as base year, we receive 1,28% annual growth value (from 690 to 3478 int$ 2011 in 1811-1938), which implies 54 446 int$ 2011 minimal target value for year 2131, when Poland's post-communist capitalism will outlast its pre-communist predeccessor, founded by Napoleon. This is really not too demanding requirement, taking into account that the U.S. GDPpc in 2018 was 55 335 int$ 2011.

Country	1885-1913	1885-1929	1888-1938	1909-1938	1913-1938	1922-1938	1929-89	1938-1989	1960-1989	1973-1989	1989-2008	1989-2014	1989-2018	GDPpc 2018	Required Growth in 2018-2040/50	OECD forecast for 2018-40
United States	1,63%	1,42%	0,99%	0,25%	0,16%	0.31%	1,89%	2,48%	2,48%	2,04%	1,66%	1,37%	1,42%	55 335		1,17%
Soviet Union	1,77%	1,08%	1,68%	1,85%	1,69%	8,18%	2,76%	2,37%	2,05%	1,01%	1,91%	2,03%	1,90%	19 539		
Albania	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,65%	Nd	1,86%	0,54%	4,13%	3,71%	3,63%	11 104		
Armenia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	0,44%	-0,23%	-0,31%	0,29%	11 454		
Azerbaijan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,10%	2,74%	2,95%	2,37%	16 628		
Belarus	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	2,24%	1,65%	1,85%	1,58%	18 727		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	2,97%	2,12%	1,67%	1,27%	1,54%	10 461		
Bulgaria	Nd	Nd	0,61% 1892-1938)	Nd	Nd	Nd	2,74%	2,83%	2,65%	1,02%	2,12%	1,86%	2,17%	18 444	3,71%	
Croatia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,56%	2,13%	2,10%	1,30%	1,58%	22 012		
Czechia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,79%	2,17%	1,89%	2,12%	3,34%	2,66%	2,74%	30 749	1,40%	2,20%
Czechoslovakia	Nd	Nd	1,39% (1890-1937)	1,38% (1910-37)	1,34% (1913-37)	2,44% (1922-37)	1,78%	2,16%	1,88%	1,38%	2,94%	2,51%	2,62%	29 601	1,55%	
Estonia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	0,51% (0,79%)	2,72% (3,16)	2,98% (2,64%)	3,18% 2,70%	1,62%	1,94% (0,71%)	2,80% (1989-2007)	1,01% 1,79%	1,31% 1,99%	27 409	3,64%	2,23%
Georgia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	2,56%	-2,67%	-1,27%	-0,57%	11 985		
Hungary	Nd	Nd	1,23% (1890-1938)	Nd	0,95%	Nd	1,72%	1,89%	2,22%	1,32%	3,30%	2,82%	2,96%	25 623	0,50%	2,12%
Kazakhstan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	0,00%	2,28%	2,73%	2,56%	25 308		
Kyrgyzstan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	-0,24%	-1,80%	-0,83%	-0,34%	5 177		
Latvia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	0,67%	2,68%	2,40%	2,46%	Nd	1,42%	1,65% 1989-2007	1,13%	1,53%	24 313	3,70%	2,50%
Lithuania	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,25%	2,10%	2,92%	2,79%	Nd	1,22%	1,87%	1,85%	2,17%	27 371	3,62%	2,28%
Moldova	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,16%	-4,09%	-2,31%	-1,44%	6 747		
Mongolia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,13%	3,30%	6,19%	7,06%	6,37%	13 383		

Montenegro	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,84%	2,20%	3,33%	3,31%	3,46%	19 504		
North Macedonia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,67%	1,97%	0,24%	0,63%	0,86%	13 074		
Poland	1,03%	1,10%	1,00%	Nd	0,91%	Nd	1,66%	1,90%	1,98%	0,39%	3,98%	3,84%	3,90%	27 455	Na	2,03%
Romania	1,34%	0,58%	0,44%	0,44%	-0,36%	1,40%	3,68%	4,28%	4,62%	2,02%	5,47%	4,65%	4,30%	20 126	4,26%	
Russia	1,77%	1,08%	1,68%	1,85%	1,69%	8,18%	2,97%	2,61%	2,91%	1,23%	2,80%	2,62%	2,30%	24 669	2,89 (2050) 3,02 (2040)	0,94%
Serbia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,58%	2,22%	0,32%	0,56%	0,88%	14 124		
Slovakia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,62%	1,98%	1,55%	0,79%	2,98%	2,52%	2,64%	27 076	1,54%	2,62%
Slovenia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	3,57%	1,73%	1,92%	1,04%	1,35%	29 245		1,28%
Tajikistan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	-1,70%	-2,96%	-1,24%	-0,38%	4 440		
Turkmenistan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	-1,63%	3,98%	5,31%	5,28%	26 318		
Ukraine	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,58%	0,37%	-0,11%	-0,09%	9 813		
Uzbekistan	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	-0,85%	-0,64%	0,99%	1,59%	11 220		
Yugoslavia	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1,00%	1,57%	2,70%	3,19%	3,37%	1,98%	1,50%	1,58%	1,79%	16 558		

Table 3. GDPpc growth rates of formerly Communist countries and U.S. 1885-2018 GDPpc data source: MPD 2020, OECD 2018, own estimates (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1913-38, Estonia 1950-1998)

Table 3 provides annual growth of the GDPpc rates, calculated for comparison periods described above. Sore point about post-communist capitalist rehabilitations and restorations is that some of them by 2018 were still not only relatively, but also absolutely regressive, with ouput per capita values lower than late socialist marks. This makes their record even worser than that of post-napoleonic restorations, where data suggest that both former metropole of Napoleonic empire and its peripheries did recover during first decade after 1814-15 just by reaping peace dividend.

Very differently, many former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics did get involved into inter- and intrastate wars or civil violence. Researchers are unanimous about the negative impact (direct or indirect) of inter- or intrastate wars on economic growth in the emerging market economies (Horowitz, 2003; Bove et al. 2017; Snyder, 2000). As a result, by 2018 there were still five states (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine) with GDPpc output levels below 1989 year. Two of them (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) can be credibly described as failed states (see 1.2).

Importantly, both of them (together with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia) belong to subset of countries with no capitalist past, where thin (endurance) and thick (performance) success of capitalist rehabilitation can be evaluated only by OIST. Except for Mongolia, all these countries were marked by negative growth or growth stagnation (Kazakhstan) in 1973-89. In two of them (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) they were replaced by strong positive growth, which was sufficient to surpass 1989 level already by 2008, while for Uzbekistan it took longer time. So by 2008 only three countries with no capitalist past (Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan) did accelerate, or were economically relatively progressive.

All three cases of early successful capitalist rehabilitation are known as exporters of energy resources (Pomfret 2016). This can explain also later growth improvement of Uzbekistan by 2018, although lack data for 1960-73 does no allow for conclusions whether this improvement was sufficient for acceleration in comparison with 1960-89 period. According to established wisdom in the development economics about „resource curse“, „Dutch disease“ or perils of oil and gas rents, rich natural resource endowments do not provide reliable basis of sustainable development (Karl 1997; Ploeg and Venables 2012; Ross 2015; Wick and Bulte 2009). However, post-Soviet accelerations of fSU republics, which did stagnate before independence due to appropriation of resource rents by imperial centre, demonstrate that such endowments may be beneficial at least in the short run. Mongolia did not stagnate in 1973-89, but emancipation from imperial centre provided enormous boost to its growth, allowing to sell the products of its mining industry at the world market prices (Bayaraa 2019).

Last observation is relevant accounting for another case of early acceleration – Azerbaijan. It deserves special consideration, because it is exception from general pattern that wars and civil violence were insuperable obstacles for early (by 2008) growth acceleration under beneficial impact of privatization and other market reforms. Arguably, rich endowments with exportable natural resources did enable Azerbaijan to accelerate despite the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994) war with Armenia, followed by armaments race and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020). However, the burden of war or war preparations did impoverish resource-poor Armenia, which only in 2017 did recover to 1989 level despite market reforms and support of Armenian diaspora by remittances and donations (Norkus et al. 2019).

The benefits of natural endowments for early achievement of economic progress despite the long run perils of resource rents and domestic violence are demonstrated also by Russian Federation, which did accelerate in 1989-2008 in comparison with 1973-89, although it fighted costly Chechen Wars 1994-96 and 1999-2009 to stop further dilution of Russian rump empire. However, next rampant militarism and imperialist foreign policy did entangle it into hybrid war with Ukraine since 2014, putting it under burden of Western sanctions. Therefore, Russia did fail accelerate over 1989-2018,

displaying lower growth rates than in 1960-89. The ongoing war with Russia makes Ukraine another case of the incompatibility of war making and economic progress under capitalist rehabilitation or restoration.

Wars and civil violence explain also absolute or relative economic regress of former Yugoslavian republics in 1989-2008, where only Slovenia and Montenegro did accelerate in 1989-2008. Slovenia did fight only brief (ten days long) and victorious Independence War in June-July 1991. Montenegro was allied with Serbia, but did manage to avoid involvement in the fighting. As a result, its GDPpc did grow in 1989-2008 by 3,33% annually, while Serbia‘s only by 0,32%. However, even Slovenia was not able to accelerate in 1989-2018 in comparison with 1960-89, and Montenegro did miss this target nearly.

All three restored Baltic States did accelerate in 1989-2007 (Estonia and Latvia) or in 1989-2008 (Lithuania) in comparison with 1973-89. The application of the OIST to Estonia are based on my estimates of its GDPpc. They are based on the work of Estonian scholars Martin Klesment, Allan Puur and Jaak Valge (2010), who did provide their own estimates of Estonia‘s output in 1950-90. This works makes Estonia second fSU republics (next to Russia), for which the comparison of growth performance in 1989-2018 and 1960-89 is possible. So Estonia belongs to the list of countries which did accelerate both in 1989-2008 (in comparison with 1973-89) and in 1989-2018 (in comparison with 1960-89). This list includes Albania, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, with Romania and Montenegro nearly missing the aim during longer period. Czech and Slovak Republics also belong to this list, provided we accept comparison of their growth in 1989-2018 with Czechoslovakia in 1960-89, because MPD does not provide separate data series for Czechia and Slovakia extending back to 1960.

Importantly, almost all post-communist countries which made or did token restorations, accelerated in 1989-2008 or 1989-2007. Exception is only war-ridden Croatia. Its failure to accelerate during both periods provides another illustration for pernicious impact of wars on the post-communist economic progress. On the other hand, all countries with type restored capitalism and countries with no capitalist past, lacking exporable natural resources endowments, failed to accelerate during this period, except for Albania (during both periods) and Montenegro (during shorther period). Resource rents indeed may be liability for middle income countries, struggling to escape „middle income trap“ (see below). But data suggest that it is advantage for poor countries struggling to escape „poverty trap“, which still was situation of late Soviet republics, endowed with natural resources.

So token restored capitalism was more economically progressive than type restored capitalism, while growth acceleration effect of capitalist rehabilitation on poor post-communist countries with no capitalist past before construction of socialism did depend on the endowments with exportable resources. Early acceleration success of token restored capitalist countries suggests that property restitution to establish of continuity with pre-communist property rights order was no obstacle for growth improvement. Instead, it was contributory positive cause. This is most important finding of the the late socialist and post-communist growth data exploration through the lense of the modern restoration theory and key finding of this chapter.

However, non-acceleration of many formerly socialist countries after some three decades under restored capitalism still does not mean ultimate economic failure of restorations. There still remain some 20 years until the 100th anniversary of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939, which did derail Eastern Europen countries for some 50 years from their „natural“ historical trajectory of development as parts (if only peripheric) of Western civilization. And there still remain some 30 years until the 120th anniversary of the Stalin‘s „Great Break“ in 1929, which did interrupt for 60 years the restoration of Russian capitalism in 1921-28.

Importantly, even if some formerly Communist countries will not be able to accelerate by 2040-50 in comparison with 1938-89 or 1929-89, they will still deem as only partial failures. By 2018, all of them with pre-communist capitalist past and date to apply OOST, did prove their performance success in the second retrospective, displaying markedly higher growth rates in 1989-2018 in comparison with 1913-38 (see Norkus 2015). Importantly, even state monopolist Russian capitalism, reputed as „sick" variety among varieties of post-communist capitalism (Szelényi and Mihályi 2019; Norkus 2012), did display stronger (2,30%) growth in 1989-2018 than its tsarist ancestor in 1885-1913 (1,77%). Among few Eastern European countries with data available for 1888-1938 period, there are no cases of strong growth. This suggests that restored capitalist systems will preserve the growth rates edge over their pre-communist ancestors until 2040. This may apply even to Russia, despite the strangling effect of Western sanctions on its economic growth since 2014.

But is not too demanding to consider as proof of relative economic progressiveness the increase of GDP per capita in 1989-2040 by (1989=100%) by 414,7% for Bulgaria, 304,2% for former Czechoslovakia, 260,0% for Hungary and Poland, 345,9% for Latvia, 406,0% for Lithuania, 380,4% for Estonia, 847,6% for Romania, and for Russia by 578,0% in 1989-2050? In fact, Poland did already hit its target by 2018, and for Hungary it was in close reach. Broad variation of target values reflect very different growth record of particular socialist countries over 1938-89 or 1929-89 eras, and in some cases also unreliability of the present MPD estimates.

Last point may foremostly apply to Romania, which according to MPD 2020 in 1938 had GDPpc level even lower than Albania in 1929. Negative growth rates of Romania in 1913-38 also can raise doubts. Indeed, experts (Aldcroft 2006: 85-93; Aldrcoft and Morewood 1995: 84; Kaser and Radice 1985: 590-596; Murgescu 2006; 2010: 214-221; Turnock 1986; 2007: 17-30) describe interwar period as the time of stagnation, explaining Romanian economic predicament by the economically disastrous agrarian reforms, difficulties of economic integration of the territories acquired after WWI with those of pre-war Romania, and by the failures of the state-led industrialization. Nevertheless, MPD 2020 data on the ouput of Romania by 1938 may still be underestimate.

To put minimal GDPpc levels for 2040-50, derived from growth rates during totalitarian era, into proper perspective, it is important to take into consideration that the ouput per capita of the U.S. in 1938-89 did increase by 349,2% (1938=100%). So the lag behind the U.S. did increase for all countries with lower growth rates during this period. And even if Romania would succeed to increase its GDPpc in 1989-2040 by 847,6%, (1989=100%), its GDPpc in 2040 would remain below the U.S. level in 2018. Only if the growth of the U.S. (or other advanced benchmark country country) would come to sudden full stop for 2020-50, some formerly communist countries would be able to catch up by 2040-50 with them by growing at the 1938-89 period rates.

However, there are no signs of the slowing down of the secular U.S. growth. Even if this would happen, this could not remain without dampening impact on the growth of other countries, given the flagman status of the U.S. economy of the world. Therefore, convergence with the U.S. and other frontier countries is not possible without stepping up growth rates beyond the 1938-89 rates. Without acceleration in comparison with intermediate system period, the gap separating formerly Communist countries from the the U.S. will not decrease in 1989-2040 or 1989-50, as it did not decrease in 1929-89 or 1938-89.

Absence of catching up growth under Communist rule sealed the failure of state socialist development project. Absence of convergence in 1989-2040/50 would disclose the economic failure of capitalist rehabilitation or restoration. For this reason, CREPS ir supplemented by AST:

AST (American standard test): ***postsocialist restoration of capitalism is economically successful, if at the end of restoration period (2040-50) the GDPpc of formerly poor Communist country is at***

least 55% of the U.S. value, and GDPpc of formerly Communist middle income country is at least 70% of the of the U.S. value

The numeric threshold values in the AST are drawn from the current discussions (Glawe and Wagner 2016; Im and Rosenblatt 2015) on the middle income trap (MIT), which is threat for countries after they escape from the poverty (or just Malthusian) trap (Oded 2011). The research on this problem is inspired by development record of very many countries which failed to converge with advanced or technological frontier countries, after they reached economic level, ensuring life standard markedly above the absolute poverty level for majorities of their populations. Then they permanently trail in backwater of frontier countries or remain (using terminology of the Wallerstenian Capitalist World System analysis) in the semiperiphery of the CWS. Economic history of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay since late 19th century exemplify in the nearly ideal typical way this track of economic record. Some authors even consider stucking in the middle income trap after escaping Malthusian poverty trap as the rule, pointing out that only few countries (Japan, Eastern Asian „tigers", Finland, Ireland) did succeed in the 20th century to move into elite club of the advanced technological frontier countries (Babones 2013).

If there were some "real achievements" of socialism, they consisted in making some formerly poor countries middle income countries by 1989, adding reservation that socialist revolution was unnecessary for this achievement. Enabling some countries to escape "poverty trap", socialist economic system led them into "middle income trap". Arguably, lack of economic progress promising the escape from "middle income trap" was perceived as "socialist stagnation" by Gorbachev and other ill-fated socialist reformers themselves. Capitalism was restored or introduced for the first time because of its promise to lead out of this trap. So according to AST economic success or relative performance success of capitalits restoration is proved by escape from middle income trapo during the time period enduring nearly as long as totalitarian era.

There are two main approaches in defining and operationalizing middle income trap (Glawe and Wagner 2016; Im and Rosenblatt 2015). According to one of them, falling into middle income trap means slowing down of initially high growth rates to level below 3-3,3% (which is considered as lower bound of high economic growth) for longer time (Eichengreen et al. 2012; 2014). The growth dynamics of many state socialist countries in 1948-89 indeed closely correspond to this pattern. So escaping from late socialist middle income trap means acceleration for longer time above this critical level. In our case set, only Albania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania and Turkmenistan did display such growth rates above 3,0% over 1989-2018, while Hungary (2,96%) nearly misssed the threshold.

In another approach, MIT is defined by just by failure to converge with the U.S. during longer time after crossing threshold separating low income countries from middle income countries. Thresholds separating low, middle and high income country groups are defined in terms of the income shares of benchmark country. Ye and Robertson (2016) specify the middle-income range between 8% and 36% of US GDPpc, Bulman et al. (2017) suggest 10%-50% US level range, and Woo (2012) defines middle-income countries as those with GDPpc between 20% and 55% of US per capita income. Lack of change of a middle income country's position with respect to U.S. during the period of some 50 years (1960-2008) or more is symptom that it is stuck in the middle income trap. For escape, the symptom of progress is improvement of relative position, culminating in the crossing the threshold separating middle income and high incoome countries.

I will use the second (U.S. benchmark) approach. Celebrating ever new anniversaries of the demise (in 1989-91) of the social system which was created by the most virulent anti-capitalist ideology, it may be just a matter of historical justice to measure the achievements of socialism, pre-

communist and post-communist capitalism with the same benchmark, which Soviet Communists did (fatefully) choose to evaluate the performance of their allegedly superior alternative in their last programme, accepted in 1961. Besides that, there is special reason to prefer this approach in this book. This is strong positively loaded presence of U.S. in the social imaginary of the Eastern European countries with the record of mass emigration to U.S. (first of all, Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia).

From proposed income level thresholds, I prefer Woo (2012) version, because it is calibrated on the state capitalist China, which shares with my cases state socialist past. However, I am using two – lower and upper bounds of the threshold separating middle and high income countries. Lower bound (55%) applies to those countries which by 1989 still were no middle income countries, having GDPpc lower than 20% of the U.S. size (Woo 2012: 314). Second threshold applies to countries, which at this time already did belong to middle income group. The purpose of second bound is to connect my criteria of capitalist restoration performance success to emic benchmarking of the economic development in those formerly Communist countries, which are accepted to the EU or apply for membership.

According broadly shared consensus in these countries, the success of economic development is measured by the convergence to the EU mean value of output[4], which during last decades did correspond to the 70% of the U.S. level. Because there was no EU before 1993, the EU mean value is no workable benchmark for assessment of the economic performance success of capitalist restoration in the long run. Its reliability is decreased by the dependence of the EU GDPpc mean value on the changes in the EU membership. The accession of large poor countries (e.g. Ukraine) would move EU GDP mean value down, as it may happen also due to departure of its rich members (most recently, the U.K.). But assuming that in 2018-2040 the EU will not fall back economically behind the U.S., the achievement of 70% of the U.S. per capita output value will remain equivalent with convergence with the EU mean, which is official or semi-official economic development aim of new EU members until 2030-40. [5] This insures my assessment of economic performance success of capitalist restoration against the vice of setting arbitrary targets.

To make the application of the U.S. benchmark possible, output values in the Table 4.4 are provided both in 2011 int$ and in %% of the U.S. value. This allows to track changes in the membership of particular countries in the Woo (2012) income groups. Comparison of the growth rates of particular countries in 1989-2018 with those of the U.S. allows to distinguish between countries which are on the convergence track (which indicates performance success of restoration) and those with no relative economic progress.

So firstly, by 1989 not all Communist countries did become middle income countries. While Russian empire in 1913 and USSR in 1929 still straddled the line between poor and middle income countries, by 1938 it already belonged to last category. But then its convergence did slow down, and by 1989 some of Soviet republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) still were poor countries together with Albania, Mongolia, Bosnia and Hercegowina, Montenegro, and Romania. Slovenia and Estonia were closest to becoming high income or just rich countries. According to MPD 2020, Slovenia even managed for some time to cross the 55%, line, with its GDPpc in 1986 making out 62,4% of the U.S. size. It did repeat this feat by 2008, but falled back after the Great Recession. Ultimately, in 2018 only Czechia did qualify as high income country by Woo (2012) criteria with output making 55,57% of the U.S. level.

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[4] See e.g. Latvija 2030; Lietuva 2030.

[5] See e.g. Latvija 2030; Lietuva 2030. Actually, some countries are even more ambitious. So Lithuania aspires to become 10th richest EU country already by 2030 (Lietuva 2030: 30).

However, because Czechia did already qualify as middle income country by 1989, to ultimately prove relative performance success of its capitalist restoration it should move to the 70% of the U.S. level or just the EU mean mark by 2040. The list of post-communist countries, which were middle income by 1989 and may be on the success track towards 70% mark includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia. Among countries, which were still poor by 1989, but may be on the success track to 55% of the U.S. output value are Albania, Mongolia, Bosnia and Hercegowina, Montenegro, Romania, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Mongolia (6,37% annual growth in 1989-2018) is absolute star performer among all formerly Communist countries.

Moving along the success track means that growth rates of all these countries in 1989-2018 were higher than those displayed by the U.S. So all these countries were economically progressive in 1989-18 according to AST. Remarkably, first group includes Russia despite its international reputation of failing state. However, despite remarkable economic progress achieved by Albania and Uzbekistan, they by 2018 only barely crossed the line dividing low and middle income countries, while Bosnia and Hercegowina still did remain poor country. There are countries, which did approach the 55% threshold by 1989, but did fail to match the U.S. growth rate in 1989-2018 (Slovenia). There are also countries, which not only did remain poor but further impoverished (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), or were middle income countries by 1989, but did impoverish relatively or absolutely under capitalist restoration (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, North Macedonia, Serbia).

Sorely, some of them (Moldova and Ukraine) did impoverish so far, that they moved back into category of poor countries. Others (Armenia and Georgia) straddled by 2016 the dividing line between poor and middle income countries. All these countries surely exemplify economic regress related to capitalist rehabilitations or restorations. Nevertheless, the cases of catching up acceleration predominate, proving overall actual economic performance success of post-communist capitalist rehabilitations and restorations.

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