

**Outcome Bias in Writing Historiography:
A Study Using Post-Game Commentary of Soccer Matches**

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Abstract

The issue of historiographical bias of historical reality is an age-old question for historical sociologists. In this paper we present an empirical investigation with two novel elements. First, we use a research design of natural experiment, in which we explore the discrepancies between a set of fully-recorded events (soccer games) as the “historical reality” and post-event analysis (sports commentaries) as “the historiography.” Second, we bring in the social psychological insight about outcome bias to examine the discrepancies but move one step further: Does outcome become a source of biased attribution even when the outcome is mistakenly ascertained in the first place? Our findings include quantifiable degrees how the “historiography” departs from the “history” and patterns in historiography writings such as over-attribution to human factors in deciding the outcome.

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Social scientists who use historical materials for research should “treat our database as ‘historiography’ or ‘histories’ and not ‘History,’” observes Lustick (1996: 605), “Historiography thus multiplies history, as each pattern in the latter produces the potential for many patterns in the former. Acknowledging our reliance on histories, not ‘History,’ will help, not hinder” our work. Take historians' images of the Middle Ages as an example, an examination of twenty major historians of the field by Cantor (1991) shows an enormous variability and the absence of a single “historic record” upon which social scientists could rely for typologies and for testing theories.

Such a distinction between historiography and historical reality is hardly in dispute. The question is this: What are the sources for the discrepancies? Of-cited reasons including the political viewpoints of the historian and availability of the research materials. In Cantor’s example, a picture of “what happened” “is just as much a function of his or her personal commitments, the contemporary political issues with which s/he was engaged, and the methodological choices governing his or her work, as of available source materials.” (1991, cf Lustick 1996)

In joining this tradition of inquiry into the sources of historiographical bias, this paper approaches from a novel angle defined by a few key elements. First, instead of familiar sources such as historians’ politics and selection of materials, we focus on historians’ cognitive processes—bringing in insights from psychology to bear. Specifically, we explore how the perspective from an event’s outcome, that is, from the hindsight, could lead to representations of the event that are spectacularly removed from what exactly happen.

Secondly, in our design we choose a special category of historical events—sports events—that are play-by-play video-taped, a reality that is fully recorded. Past research about historiographical bias is a guess work at best, because there is no recorded reality as a baseline to compare to. Extensive records may be available for real-life events such as a presidential campaign, but the picture is much less complete for its lack of play-by-play details.

That the event is fully recorded with best available data possible is why we choose to use professional sports events to study the writing of historiography. Sports events such as professional soccer games are recorded and live broadcast in real time. This recording of the “history” is accompanied by documentation of key statistics about the performance of the two teams during the entire course of the game. Major among them are percentage of ball procession, the number of attempted shots, and number of corner kicks. These indexes about the event’s elements are even better indicators about the players’ effort than the final match score, the outcome. These data, therefore, provide us a basis to judge if the criticism of their effort is fair, regardless of the final outcome of the game.

The third element in your research design is to study historiography of the events whose outcome is *mistakenly ascertained*. When the outcome is genuine, there is a real chance that what is being said of the causes of the outcome, although seen from hindsight, to be correct. It is possible to be correct to say the coach’s strategy is bad for a game that is truly lost, while it is impossible to be correct to say the coach’s strategy is the cause of a loss if the game in fact has been won.

OUTCOME BIAS AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION

A presidential campaign failed; a student did not land a dream school; a soccer game was lost. How is the history of success or failure written? The historian's perspective is likely to be tainted by the positive or negative outcomes. The scholarship under the rubric of attribution theories has clear insights into this question (Crittenden 1983; Harvey et al. 2014). Particular helpful are the findings about "outcome bias" in the psychologist's experiments, as summarized by Allison et al. (1996:56):

"Outcomes appear to bias our judgments about their origins and causes, influence our evaluations of the individuals who produce them, affect our estimates of how frequently others produce them, bias our assessments about who is responsible for them, influence our estimates of how foreseeable they should have been, affect our beliefs about how likely they are to occur in the future, bias our perceptions of how much they were deserved, influence our beliefs about how controllable and preventable they were, and affect how satisfied we are with them in comparison to other possible outcomes."

There are two related concepts, "Hindsight Bias," which focuses on perceivers' tendency to inflate certainty over chance factors and luck (Roese and Vohs 2012) and "Motivational Bias," which reveals perceivers' penchant to mispresent the causality as a defense mechanism for self-image (Burger 1981). Together they offer three important ideas.

Dichotomous Coloring

The dichotomous nature of the outcome that is known to the "historian" casts a long shadow back to the presentation of the other elements of the event, in the way for them to be consistent with the outcome. For example, as cited by Allison et al. (1996), a winning presidential candidate may garner only 50.7% of voter support, but observers of the election

appear more than willing to overlook the diversity of voter opinion that this percentage of support clearly implies. As Newsweek's coverage of Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory suggests, a common and seemingly reasonable conclusion is that the election outcome reflects the preferences of those who produced it. "Perceivers, in short, tend to show an outcome bias in their social judgments, attributing characteristics to people that correspond to the outcomes that those people generate, even when known or available information suggests that there is very little correspondence." (1996:56-57)

Exaggerated Certainty

In the studies of "Hindsight Bias," a version of the outcome bias, research subjects are found to feel that they "knew it all along," that is, when they believe that an event is more predictable after it becomes known than it was before it became known. Consequences of hindsight bias include "myopic attention to a single causal understanding of the past (to the neglect of other real explanations) as well as general overconfidence in the certainty of one's own judgement" (Roese and Vohs 2014). A number of subsequent studies supported the idea that people tend to view past outcomes as foreseeable, inevitable, and even preventable (Allison et al. 1996).

This assertive attitude, coupled with the aforementioned sense of certainty, is detrimental to finding the real causes of the outcome. Often times, the known information may only account for a fraction of the variation of the outcome, to use a language familiar to sociological students, that is "the R^2 is small." The real cause may lie elsewhere, unknown to human observers. In other words, one has to be able to appreciate uncertainty—colloquially known as chance or luck

—to not mistake something observable as the true cause of the outcome. This tendency of exaggerating certainty also paves the way for a third tendency.

Over-attention to Human Factors

The outcome of an event is invariably a result of a complex set of factors in which human factors may or may not be decisive in producing the particular outcome. But the need for order, control and justice prompt individuals to highlight human factors in their analysis at the expense of others, all the while they risk overlooking the true cause of the outcome as well as dismissing the chance factors or luck.

In a classic study, Walster (1966) explored how perceivers of negative behavioral outcomes show an outcome bias in assigning responsibility for those outcomes. That is, perceivers tend to blame people more for actions that yield extremely negative outcomes than for identical actions that yield only mildly negative outcomes. The finding on the over-attention to human factors have been confirmed by a long line of subsequent studies (e.g., Shaver’s 1970; Fischhoff 1975; Lerner and Miller’s 1978). Such habit of attribution is “motivational” in the sense that people use outcomes as vehicles for imposing *order*, *control*, and *justice* on a world that is often disorderly, uncontrollable, and unjust (Allison et al. 1996).

To apply these ideas

We expect three types of postmortem attribution biases among the “historians” in our project (see Research Design below).

- “Negative coloring”: the assertion of a lost game provides the most important guiding principle to recount what has happened and why the outcome.

- “Oversight on Chance factor” to the degree that the game is mistakenly judged (that is, a game that is in fact won is seen as a loss)
- “Human-factor determinism,” which excessively attribute to human factors—including strength, organization, leadership, strategies, and efforts—as the key for the success or failure.
 - As further pattern of this determinism is the weight put on efforts and motivation as the most important human factors. The result is blamed for lack of effort, “winning mentality,” or “fighting spirit.”

PROFESSIONAL INTEREST AS FACILITATING FACTOR¹

Tainted by outcome bias, a historiographic representation is to some extent a distortion of historical reality. In the worse cases, it would be superficially plausible, hence intellectually shallow. One may imagine, therefore, such representations would encounter countervailing forces from fellow historians or the target audience. Alas, *Professional Interest* can be a factor that exacerbates outcome bias.

Take the professional historians in the Party-State of communist China as an example. Their professional interest lies in glorifying the party and its leader. Hence the outcome of the 1949 victory of the Communist Revolution is the basis of the country’s textbook history, and in it, human ingenuity is written as the most decisive factor. The history is all about extensive mass mobilization and the revolutionary leaders’ strategy, while historians would point to elsewhere for explanation, including the international development of the World War II in winning the anti-Japanese War and a corrupt and inept adversary in the Civil War (Bianco 1971).

¹ This section will be elaborated further by reviewing more literature from the field of “media psychology” and “media professions.”

By the same token, the paramount concern for sports commentators, i.e., the “historians” in our current project, is readership or viewership. Judged by newspaper readers or TV viewers, their goal is to sound plausible the ear of the public, even if at the expense of accuracy and penetrating insight. To blame a coach for a game that is known to be lost is what the TV viewers can understand and endorse. Anything different may be less helpful to the program’s ratings.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Our study codes post-game commentaries on the soccer games that are not truly lost, or “the Fake Lost Games,” from three major international soccer tournaments, 2018 FIFA World Cup, 2016 UEFA European Championship, and 2019 to 2020 UEFA Champions League. We analogize soccer matches as “history,” sports commentators as “historians,” post-game analyses as “historiographies,” and document their attribution of “success” or “failure” on the fake lost games. Through this research, we would like to investigate that how far is the distance between “history” and “historiography?” Is the distance even measurable? Through answering these questions, we would like to pave the way for revising historical sociology methods.

Fake Lost Game (FLG) Explained

We define fake lost games as those that would have been counted as a win or a tie had woodworks, (which means shots that were blocked by goalposts or the bar,) been counted as goals. Namely, we first identify games containing woodworks in three tournaments, and then review them by reading their live match reports and watching replays. After that, we recalculate their score-line by counted all woodworks as goals. If the final result could alter by the

recalculations, then we define the match as a FLG. We design this study is mainly because the woodworks are nearly the most crucial factor in determining the ultimate result in a FLG.

Therefore, post-match commentaries on FLGs provide us with unique chances to investigate if human perception could recognize those crucial moments in history.

Data Sources and Coding Procedures

We collect all detailed match statistics from www.whoscored.com. We first identify all those games with woodworks from a total of 234 matches in three tournaments. Then, we review these woodwork games and recalculate their score-line by counted all woodwork as goals. We discovered that the recalculations could alter 28 final results, which means the rate of FLGs in three tournaments is 12.0%. After that, we collected post-game reports, commentaries, and analyses based on the 28 FLGs from major media and sports websites. The 28 FLGs generated a total of 151 pieces of article. We then code each commentary based on their attributions of the final results. Because we would like to know how reporters or sports analysts attributed the same game differently, thus our unit of analysis is each article.

We collect commentaries from three varied types of media: general news, sports news, and professional analysis. General news refers to articles that are from non-sports-related media. For instance, *the New York Times*, *the Telegraph*, *Washington Post*, etc., are all general sources without professional sports column, but covered the three tournaments mainly because of their newsworthiness. The sports news indicates the article is from a sports-related media, like *BBC Sport*, *ESPN*, *CBS Sports*, etc., which are all have sports columns and specialists in sports reports. The third group of sources, professional analysis, are specialized soccer experts, which are not just for the public but also professionalizes readers. We include many of these

professional analyses, in which *Total Football Analysis* and *The Coaches' Voices* are the representatives. 25.8% of commentaries are general news, 53.0% of sports news, and 21.2% of professional analyses.

Analytical Procedures

There are 61 variables in our analysis, which are either about the match or the article. Variables about the match are detailed statistics. For instance, we would like to know the actual score-line and number of woodworks, correctness of predictions before the match, ball possession rate, number of corners, and so on. Besides the types of media, we also would like to know whether the commentators can recognize the fakeness of the final score-lines. So, we define “recognized a FLG” by two criteria: mention woodworks that happened during the match, and concede the final result could alter. If the article recognizes neither, then we code the level of recognizing as “0.” When commentators only mention woodworks but not conceded FLG, we code the level as “1;” otherwise, it will be “2” when the article recognized it is a FLG.

We also want to know how commentaries attribute the outcomes. We identify four major types of attributions: eventful attribution, anthropocentric attribution, motivational attribution, and other attributions. Eventful attribution means the commentator attributes the most crucial reason to one or a sequence of events, e.g., a nice shot in the 79th minutes or a crucial save by the goalkeeper in the 89th minutes. In other words, in this kind of attribution, the commentator tends to form temporal narratives to explain why and how the final score-line had happened in that way. There are nine sub-variables within eventful attribution, which are the most common events that could occur and affect the final result before or during a match.

Anthropocentric attribution means the commentator attribute the main reason to people. There are three sub-attributions in this category: structural reasons, players' reasons, and coaches' reasons. Structural reasons refer to 1) capability of squads, namely players' ability or skills, which could be an accumulative result of a country's youth training system, a club's financial capacity to buy talented players, and so on. 2) team management, e.g., the club's decision to hire a coach or sell a player, a national soccer association's decision to introduce a new policy, and so on. 3) Other structural reasons, which means human-related factors that could not be controlled or operated by individuals before or during the match. Players' reasons and coaches' reasons simply mean that players' or coaches' behaviors caused the outcome.

Motivational attribution are commentaries attributed to psychological factors, like supports or doubts from fans, spiritual quality of the team, and so on. Other attribution contains three sub-variables, luck, supernatural forces, and other uncontrollable reasons. Attributing to luck does not necessarily mean the commentator views woodwork as the primary variable. They could attribute the unluck to a missing penalty or a referee's decision. Supernatural Forces mean the commentator did not use the term "luck" or "fortune," but mainly attributed to a team or players' fate or curse.

There are still many shortages and limitations in this research design. For instance, the small sampling numbers limit its accuracy and applications. However, we still hold the prospect that future researchers could develop more advanced studies. We also believe that this research design could apply to other sports. For instance, it is not uncommon in basketball to lose a game by only one or two points. Such failure is primarily due to chance factors, but the commentators will make a big deal out of this fact, citing fighting spirit and so on. Furthermore, this kind of

study could benefit the methodology development of sociology in general, which is also a question worth considering more.

FINDINGS

Uncertainty Neglected (It's hard to recognize the fakeness)

Given that the woodworks are the most crucial factor in determining the FLGs' results, do commentators mention woodworks in their analyses? More importantly, can they recognize the fakeness of the FLGs? We code an article as "recognized the fakeness" if it admits that the final score-line does not reflect the match's actual process and could potentially alter. However, recognized the fakeness does not necessarily mean the commentator views woodwork as the primary variable, who could also attribute the fake outcome to other contingencies, like a missing penalty, a referee's false decision in a critical moment, and so on. Hence, we also want to know whether commentators mention woodworks in their analyses. Tables 1 shows the rate of mentioning woodworks and whether commentators could recognize the fakeness. It shows that, among 151 articles, only 57.6% of commentaries mentioned the woodworks, and 88.1% of reports could not identify outcomes' fakeness. Therefore, we argue that it is very hard for commentators to detect outcomes' fakeness. And not only that, nearly half of the analyses do not even mention one of the most important variables that could change the outcomes.

(Table 1 about here)

We then would like to know how do commentators attribute the final results of the 28 FLGs. From table 2, we could find out that there are 55.0% of articles consider human factors as the fundamental causes of the consequences. And 38.4% of commentators focused on how

crucial events before or during the matches lead to the consequences. Only 5.3% of articles attribute the final results to motivational factors, like supports from the fans, spiritual quality of the team, and so on. Also, there are 1.3% of analysts who believe other factors, e.g., fate or luck, cause the final results. Based on these statistics, we could see that anthropocentric factors are the most frequent attributions. Namely, commentators tend to overlook the real causes and to praise or blame individuals for the consequences. Constructing a narrative based on one or a sequence of crucial events is also a common way of attribution. Furthermore, only a small proportion of commentaries emphasize motivational or other factors that determine the final results.

(Table 2 about here)

Based on the descriptive statistics, we argue that: 1) it is not easy for people to recognize the outcome's fakeness and identify the most crucial variables. 2) Anthropocentric attributions are the most common biases when people attribute. Which is to say, people tend to over-estimate the importance of human factors, thus let individuals take responsibility for consequences, even when which were, in fact, determined by other elements that human cannot control.

Over-attention to Human Factor (Players have to take responsibilities for unexpected results)

Since the anthropocentric attribution is the most frequent bias, this section will investigate when and who are more likely to be taken responsibilities or credits for the final results. There are three variables in the anthropocentric attribution: structural reasons, players' reasons, and coaches' reasons. As we have mentioned in the previous section, structural reasons mean attributors believe the capability of squads or team management caused the outcome. Player's reason represents that analysts emphasize the effects of one or more individual players' performance on the final results. Coaches' reason indicates that coaches' tactics, formations

choices, training preparation, etc., were considered as primary factors. Table 3 shows that, for articles that attribute anthropocentric factors as the primary reasons, there are 6.0% find the structural factors determine the outcomes. Players and coaches are usually being praised or blamed at a similar level, which is about 45% to 50%.

(Table 3 about here)

Then, we would like to know that precisely, the results conformed or incompatible with predictions under different circumstances, how attribution would shift from players to coaches and vice versa. Therefore, we introduced another variable, the “correctness of prediction.” We collect prediction data from sports gambling websites² then compare it with the actual final score-line. If the final result is the same as predictions, then code the variable as “1”, and “0” for incorrect prediction. After that, we run a cross-tabulation analysis for correctness of prediction and three sub-anthropocentric attributions, shown in table 4.

(Table 4 about here)

Based on table 4, we see that structural reasons remain at the same level when the actual results are either the same or different from predictions. The chances of coaches being praised or blamed would increase when the actual score-line is the same as people’s predictions. It means leadership related factors, like strategies, tactics, command ability, and so on, are usually be discussed when the outcome is consistent with prediction. On the other hand, when the outcome is different from people’s forecast prior to the match, an individual or a group of players will take credits or responsibilities for the unexpected outcome. However, we found that the chi-square value for the cross-tabulation test is 0.2604, which is lower than the critical value of 5.99

² Most of the prediction data are from the gambling website, www.topbet.eu. If the data are incomplete, then we use betting odds data from *CBS Sports*.

at a significant level of 0.95. The p-value of 0.878 is also higher than 0.05. This could be caused by the inadequate of cases that are “same with prediction.”

Based on the analyses on anthropocentric biases, we argue that 1) when outcome compatible with people’s predictions, attributors pay more attention to the leadership; 2) on the other hand, players will be forced to take the credits or responsibilities when the result is different from people expectations.

Bias Exacerbated (Professional analyses are more likely to have outcome bias)

In this section, we will discuss how different types of sources relate to commentators’ attribution. We categorized 151 articles into three varied types: general news, sports news, and professional analysis. General news refers to pieces that are from non-sports-related media. For instance, *the New York Times*, *the Telegraph*, *Washington Post*, etc., are general sources that do not have professional sports columns but covered the soccer matches mainly due to their newsworthiness. The sports news indicates the article is from a sports-related media, like *BBC Sport*, *ESPN*, *CBS Sports*, etc., which are all have sports columns and specialists in sports reports. The third group of sources, professional analysis, are specialized soccer experts, which are not just for the public but also professionalizes readers. We covered many of these professional websites, in which *Total Football Analysis* and *The Coaches’ Voices* are the representatives. We then investigate and compare how professionalization levels would impact attributors’ recognition of woodworks and fakeness of games.

(Table 5 about here)

Based on the cross-tabulation test in table 5, we found out that as more professionalized as the analyses, it is harder for commentators to recognize the potential importance of the

woodworks and the fakeness of the outcome. In table 5, from the section of “recognize neither,” we could see that there are 69.2% of general news and 68.7% of sports news that either mentioned woodworks or recognized the fakeness, but only 28.1% of professional analyses did. On the other hand, in the section of “mentioned woodworks,” it also has 64.1% of general news and 67.5% of sports news that mentioned woodworks, compare to only 25.0% of professional analyses did. More importantly, we found out that, among the articles that recognized the fakeness, 12.8% of general news and 13.7% of sport news conceded the fakeness of outcomes. There are only 6.2% of professional analyses realized the games’ final results are fake. By comparing attributional biases in different sources, we argue that professionalized analyses that rely on statistical analyses are more likely to have outcome biases.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In conclusion, by proposing an innovative study on the attributional biases in the post-match analyses based on FLGs in three major international soccer tournaments, we found out that 1) it is very difficult for commentators to recognize the fakeness of the outcomes, in which only 11.9% of articles did; 2) Anthropocentric bias is the most common outcome bias with 55.0% of articles; 3) Individual players were forced to take uneven responsibilities when the outcome is different from people’s prediction; while coaches more likely to take credits when the final result consistent with the prediction. 4) Professionalized analyses based on statistical data are very easy to overlook contingencies and have outcome bias.

We believe that our findings and research methods could potentially be applied to many fields, especially the historical sociology studies, to reveal existing biases in the current field.

From the perspective of revising contemporary methods, our research shows that, first, we should pay attention to the uncertainty of historical events rather than treat those as deterministic outcomes. Second, we should be aware of contingencies or chance factors in analyses, rather than only attribute to human-related elements. We should not over-estimate the effects of anthropogenic factors. Finally, professionalized analyses had its limitations, which are very likely to disregard the fakeness of the consequences.

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Table 1: Whether recognizing the fakeness

	No	Yes	Total
Mention Woodworks	64 (42.4)	87 (57.6)	151 (100.0)
Recognize the Fakeness	133 (88.1)	18 (11.9)	151 (100.0)

Table 2: Primary attributions

Eventful Attribution	Anthropocentric Attribution	Motivational Attribution	Other Attribution	Total
58 (38.4)	83 (55.0)	8 (5.3)	2 (1.3)	151 (100.0)

Table 3: Anthropocentric attributions

Structural Reasons	Players' Reasons	Coaches' Reasons	Total
5 (6.0)	41 (49.4)	37 (44.6)	83 (100.0)

Table 4: Anthropocentric attributions by predictions

	Structural Reasons	Players' Reasons	Coaches' Reasons	Total
Same with prediction	1 (6.2)	7 (43.8)	8 (50.0)	16 (100.0)
Different with prediction	4 (6.0)	34 (50.8)	29 (43.3)	67 (100.0)
Total	5 (6.02)	41 (49.4)	37 (44.6)	83 (100.0)

$\chi^2 = 0.2604$, $p = 0.878$

Table 5: Recognize fakeness in different types of sources

Types of Sources	Recognize Neither		Mention Woodworks		Recognize Fakeness		Total
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
General News	27 (69.2)	12 (30.8)	14 (35.9)	25 (64.1)	34 (87.2)	5 (12.8)	39 (100.0)
Sports News	55 (68.7)	25 (31.3)	26 (32.5)	54 (67.5)	69 (86.3)	11 (13.7)	80 (100.0)
Professional Analyses	9 (28.1)	23 (71.9)	24 (75.0)	8 (25.0)	30 (93.8)	2 (6.2)	32 (100.0)
Total	91 (60.3)	60 (39.7)	64 (42.4)	87 (57.6)	133 (88.1)	18 (11.9)	151 (100.0)

Recognized Neither: $\chi^2 = 18.3895$, $p = 0.001$; Mentioned Woodworks: $\chi^2 = 17.8125$, $p = 0.000$; Recognize Fakeness: $\chi^2 = 1.2651$, $p = 0.531$

Appendix

Coding Sheet for FLGs and TLGs Data Collection

Article ID _____

About the Match

[V10100] Tournament _____

[V10200] Match Date _____

[V10300] Knockout Stage _____

[V10400] Home Team (HT) _____

[V10500] Away Team (AT) _____

[V10600] HT Final Score _____

[V10700] AT Final Score _____

[V10800] HT Woodwork Number _____

[V10900] AT Woodwork Number _____

[V11000] Correctness of Prediction _____

[V11100] Attempt _____

[V11101] HT Shots on Target _____

[V11102] AT Shots on Target _____

[V11200] Control _____

[V11201] HT Possession _____%

[V11202] AT Possession _____%

[V11300] Defend _____

[V11301] HT Tackles _____

[V11302] AT Tackles _____

About the Article

[V20100] Type of the Source _____

[V20200] Level of Awareness of the Fakeness

[V20201] Mention Woodworks? _____

[V20202] Recognize the Fakeness? _____

[V20300] Primary Attribution _____

[V20400] Eventful Attribution _____

[V20401] Suspension of Players _____

[V20402] Health Condition before the Match _____

[V20403] Score Line and Goals _____

[V20404] Key Eventful Performance _____

[V20405] Key Eventful Mistakes _____

[V20406] Injuries during the Match _____

[V20407] Conflicts _____

[V20408] Referee's Decision _____

[V20409] Other Eventful Attribution _____

[V20500] Anthropocentric Attribution _____

[V20510] Structural Reasons _____

[V20511] Capability of Squads _____

[V20512] Team Management _____

[V20513] Other Structural Reasons _____

[V20520] Players' Reasons _____

[V20521] Individual Performance _____

[V20522] Team Performance _____

[V20523] Other Players' Reasons _____

[V20530] Coaches' Reasons _____

[V20531] Training and Preparation _____

[V20532] Formation _____

[V20533] Squad Selection _____

[V20534] Tactic _____

[V20535] Substitution _____

[V20536] Other Coaches' Reasons _____

[V20600] Motivational Attribution _____

[V20601] Supports or Doubts from Fans _____

[V20602] Spiritual Quality of the Team _____

[V20603] Historical Records before the Tournament _____

[V20604] Current Records during the Tournament _____

[V20605] Other Psychological Factors of Players _____

[V20606] Other Psychological Factors of Coaches _____

[V20700] Other Attribution _____

[V20701] Luck _____

[V20702] Supernatural Forces _____