

# **Ever Failed? Fail Again, Fail Better: Tuition protests in Germany, Turkey, and the United States**

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At the turn of the millennium, multiple countries erupted in student protests against tuition hikes in public universities. Despite arising in varying political contexts, these protests followed remarkably similar paths to achieving concessions. In this chapter, I compare student protests against tuition hikes across three different welfare state types: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. I argue that the crucial commonality across these cases was the formation of unexpected alliances made possible by the failures of past movements. I show that past “failures” become a building block in how the movement actors position themselves in the field of higher education policy which enables different options for alliance-building.

## **INTRODUCTION**

“Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail Again. Fail better.” This is a rather dark quote from Samuel Beckett that foresees a life where the best outcome is a better failure. It reflects the mood higher education activists share across the board in many countries. Many find themselves locked in a battle against a never-ending onslaught of neoliberal reforms that keep privatizing public higher education, taking away the agency of the students and faculty alike by turning them into customers and service providers. For some, universities are turning into graveyards where the ideals of public higher education are buried six feet under. Never to walk the earth again. And yet it is perhaps analytically more meaningful to take Beckett’s words out of context and take it literally. Past “failures” could nevertheless build a legacy to take small steps towards the outcomes these disillusioned activists have once sought. In this chapter, I present a comparative historical analysis of the outcome of the student protests against tuition hikes in three different welfare state types: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. I show that the perceived positionality of the self in past failures as narrated in collective memory making could influence the structure of the alliances movement actors later build.

All three countries experienced strong student mobilizations in the 1960s and 70s that shaped the institutional involvement of student collective action in the later decades. Despite the relative silence of the student movements in late 1980s and 1990s, they were once again revived in the 2000s. They were inevitably based on the institutional legacy of the past movements and a partial memory of what had been once possible. Donatella et al (2018) analyze the legacy of the social movements in democratic transitions and identify two paths; eventful transitions and elite pacts. In the former, movements play a major role in changing the political system while in the latter the elites take the spot light. In eventful transitions, we would expect open and inclusive political opportunities for the movement actors because of the positive memory of the role movements played. In elite pacts, we would expect closed and selective political opportunities because movements either took a supporting role or are simply reduced to the extras on the movie set. In this paper, I build on these findings. I show that the institutional set up of the contemporary student organizations reflect the legacy of the student movement in the 1960s. Furthermore, I build an analogy to the eventful transitions and elite pacts to argue that when student movement's perceived impact in the 1960s resemble eventful transitions, they might be recognized as an important player even when their mobilization is relatively small. If, on the other hand, their involvement is marginalized in the narratives, then they might have to get involved in elite pacts to get recognition.

Collective action has unintended consequences, they may not reach their stated goals but might create an advantage for the constituency (Amenta Caren et al 2010:290), create a legacy (Polletta and Kretschmer 2013) or lay the organizational structures which could trigger another wave of mobilization with an advantageous outcome in the long run (Andrews 2001). This

chapter builds on unintended consequences to discuss how past “failures” motivate alliance building in the next wave of mobilization.

Most of the studies on student mobilization focus on the moments when the mobilization makes the biggest impact. However, examining mostly “successful” moments contributes to selection bias (McAdam and Boudet 2012). I argue that past “failures” become a building block in two ways: through the organizational structures that open a possibility of alliance building and through the outsiders’ perceptions built around the political power of a movement actor’s collective identity. At the organizational level, it turns into a collective learning experience that has the capacity to reshape alliance structures.

However, studies that focus on the impact of past mobilizations mostly rely on extensive case studies and rarely on comparative work. I show that the crucial commonality across the cases of Germany, Turkey and the United States was the formation of unexpected alliances made possible by the failures of the past movements. I ask, in protest waves where the activist cadres remain intact, could collective memory work mediate the lessons derived from past “failures”? If so, how?

To answer this question and show different paths of collective memory work activists put, this research takes a comparative approach to capture variation across political and organizational structures. In this case, a comparison of anti-tuition hike mobilization that incorporated alliances between student organizations and labor unions in Germany, Turkey, and the United States.

I combined interview and media coverage data in all three cases to examine the dynamics in different ways of mobilization. In Germany, student protests in the first half of the 2000s failed to stop the introduction of tuitions. Conservative-led states introduced tuition fees.

However, a second wave that started after the introduction of tuition fees managed to get tuition fees abolished. I focus on the case of Hesse which has been the first state to abolish tuition fees after their introduction. In Turkey, leftist students demanded free tuition for three decades. They were only able to decrease the amount of hikes. In the 2010s, former student activists were also active in the unions. Together with decreasing membership figures and government policies targeting opposition unions, labor unions supported student groups mobilizing against tuition hikes. This time the mobilization resulted in the announcement of the abolition of tuitions in public universities. In the United States, on the other hand, despite rising tuition fees, there has not been a national movement against the hikes. However, state-level mobilization provides important insights into the dynamics of alliance building with the political context of the USA. I focus on California as its higher education system has been presented as exemplary for the country and the OECD (Rothblatt 1992). In the 1990s, protests against hikes got fragmented in California and failed to stop the hikes.

I offer a meso level analysis where past failures turn into an empowering capacity that later shape the strategic intentions of the actors through collective memory work. Depending on the interpretation of these failures, actors might position themselves differently in the field of higher education. This positionality then could influence the degree and duration of the alliances they build.

By using a comparative research design that can uncover and explain variation across waves of anti-tuition hike mobilizations, this study contributes to the literature on alliance building and movement outcomes. In addition to the structural constraints and opportunities, the selectivity of collective memory work mediates these constraints and opportunities for alliance building.

## COLLECTIVE MEMORY, MOVEMENT OUTCOMES, AND ALLIANCE BUILDING

Collective memory work is social. It is social not just because people try to reshape each other's perception of the past but also because the outcome of the efforts to influence collective memory might depend on the power relations and the structure of networks (Zamponi 2013). While some short-term framing strategies work for campaigns, collective memory building require long term commitments to a narrative (Wang et al 2018, Amenta and Polletta 2019). Long-term commitments to collective memory formation might trigger a new cycle of mobilization through the constant reiteration of specific events, modes of collective action, or organizational formation (Schwarz 2019, Kornetis 2019, Whitlinger 2019).

Collective memory could also enlarge the sphere of influence of an ongoing mobilization. Alliance building is one way to increase the impact of collective action if it changes the perception of other plays that might open new possibilities of collaboration. Two mechanisms can link collective memory with alliance building motivations. One mechanism is solidarity networks that form through collective memory work. Solidarity lies at the root of social movements, both as a dynamic for building intra-movement relations and as a resource to gain influential allies. Internal solidarity is necessary to build bonds between the members in a social movement (Della Porta and Diani 1991) while external solidarity depicts identification with groups one does not belong to (Hunt and Benson 2004). Movement organizations might form temporary alliances based solely on pragmatic motivations but for a big number of social movement alliances external solidarity is the first step towards alliance building. Scholars suggest that preexisting social ties and common identities make alliance formation easier (Van

Dyke and Amos 2017). Through collective memory work, activist groups might form a common identity that enables alliance formation in the long run.

Another mechanism that links collective memory and alliance building is the politics of remembrance, which itself requires collective action. Collective memory, in this sense, is composed of two parts; the politics of the collective in the present and the instrumentalization of the past. Movements might try to challenge the established power structures by institutionalizing their own instrumentalization of the past (Gongaware 2010). In an environment where odds for a meaningful positive outcome is perceived to be slim collective memory work – that is creating a narrative of the past mobilizations to inspire present action could be used to alter the perceptions of protest participants. The reinterpretation of past failures could fragment fledgling movements (Zamponi 2012) or could unite different factions of the movement. For example, in the case of Turkey, opposition to tuition hikes continued for more than a quarter of a century without any tangible gain. Carrying the torch of previous generations became a motivator for some activists, as I will explain below. Nevertheless, different groups would highlight different memories based on changing contexts and groups' self-demarcation in the movement field (Zamponi and Daphni 2014). Movements could utilize strategic remembrances by building frameworks that build ties with the past and then reject some parts of it (Daphni and Zimmermann 2020).

Social movement scholarship has increasingly sought to understand the dynamics of alliance building as alliances are important to expand the boundaries of a social movement, share know-how and influence policy outcomes (Wang, Piazza and Soule 2018, McAdam et al 2001, Levi and Murphy 2006). Social movement groups seek alliances to increase their resources (McCammon and Campbell 2002, Staggenborg 1986), make better use of emerging opportunities (McAdam 1982, Isaac and Christiansen 2002) as perceived by the activists (Kurzman 1996), and

provide a stronger reaction to perceived threats (Dixon and Martin 2012, Dolgon 2001, McCammon and Van Dyke 2010, Reese, Petit and Meyer 2010). These reactions might be triggered by events (Fisher et al 2017, Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005, Vasi 2006), counter-movements (Zald and McCarthy 1980), or an optimism about the effectiveness of collective action (Kadivar 2013).

In contribution to these discussions, I argue that this strategic remembrance of past failures could be an important facilitator for alliance building. The point of reference could be the past generation or the past protest cycle. This remembrance could be a positive narrative of the past or a negative one that indicates a lesson learned. Previously, case studies of student protests have indicated the importance of memory work. In Turkey, the legacy of 1968 was used to establish a student union which took an active part in anti-tuition hike protests (Erdoğan 2013). Similarly, the student movement in Brazil in the late 1970s built on the memory of the 1960s, the heroic efforts and self-sacrifice of the past generation (Mishe 2008). While this memory work could happen for a new generation of activists' reinterpretation of the past, it could also occur within the same generation to make sense of the events the activists themselves participated. For example, in the United States, student activists organized many sit-ins against racial segregation in the 1960s. They later narrated their involvement and the spread of protests "like a fever" which helped contribute to the recruitment of new activists even if there was no institutionalization of the narrative yet (Polletta 2006). However, the students movement at the time is largely narrated through the civil rights movement (Biggs and Andrews 2015). These findings demonstrate the role the reconstruction of the past plays in the movements in reinterpreting the legacies of protests.

However, the impact of these legacies on alliance building is rarely explored especially in comparative work in interaction with different political structures.

## CASE SELECTION

I selected three different cases that have different tuition regimes, welfare state types, different degrees of higher education centralization, as well as political or organizational structures. Because of the differences in political structure and decentralized decision making in the federal states of Germany and the United States, I focus on one state that has played a vanguard role in higher education. Despite all these differences, in all three cases, students were able to stop tuition hikes after a “failed” attempt but followed different trajectories as proposed by scholars based on the perception of movement legacies (Donatella et al 2018). They were able to build alliances with the unions. They might not have stopped neoliberal reforms altogether as some of them hoped to do but they “failed” better.

As I have discussed in the theoretical framework, scholars who study alliance building in social movements point out the following factors that motivate alliance seeking: need to increase resources, provide a stronger reaction to perceived threats or take advantage of emerging opportunities. The brokerage of key actors helps facilitate alliance-building, so does the instrumental use of collective memory. The table below summarizes the characteristics of each case based on the presence of these factors.

Case	Brokerage (Former student activists in unions)	Collective Memory (student movement influential in the 60s)	Perceived threat I (Unions under threat)	Perceived threat II (Prior student mobilization “failure”)
Germany (Hesse)	N/A	1	1	1



Turkey	1	1	1	1
USA (California)	1	0.5	0	1

Brokerage and collective memory facilitate anti-tuition hike alliances. Student movement “failures” in the past two decades help increase their know-how and motivate alliance seeking. However, the narration of the role the students played in the eventful 1960s shape the perception of self-efficacy that influences the movement actors to act in pacts or in more equally formed alliances. In all three cases, facilitation and threat perception factors were present.

In Hesse, Germany student mobilization happened in two waves: in 2003-2005 and 2006-08. Students could not stop the introduction of the tuition fees in Hesse and were disillusioned with the symbolic protests and lobbying tactics they used to reach to the political insiders. In the second wave, unions’ commitment to highlighting tuition fees as a prominent election issue as well as the students’ willingness to change their tactics based on prior mobilization motivated a closer alliance between unions and the students. However, the legacy of the ’68 movement still created a narrative of self-potential even if the participants were skeptical about the fulfillment of that potential.

In Turkey, student mobilization of the 1990s created a sub-culture for leftist students to keep pursuing anti-tuition hike protests with strategic utilization of a collective memory of dissent. Furthermore, the students who were active in the 1990s, later on, took an active part in the unions in the 2000s. They played a crucial brokerage role in building informal relationships between labor and higher education unions and political student organizations. Furthermore, the surge of the narrative of the 60s and the power of the students to shape politics have also contributed to a vision that students could change higher education policy if they gather enough support. While these factors facilitated alliance building, past failure of the student mobilization and the government’s increasing pressure on the unions motivated alliance-seeking.

Finally, in the case of California, United States, the positions former student activists took in the unions led to the formation of organic ties with some of the unions and the student groups. These ties helped facilitate alliance-building even if there was not much of collective memory work used during the mobilization. Prior “failure” of the lobbying efforts of the students to stop tuition hikes led them to take more contentious and assertive action. Unlike the case in Germany and Turkey, there was no national movement against tuition hikes. However, many unions and NGOs in California had been working for a new measure to increase public spending due to a perceived advantage to push for change. Student mobilization was able to join this union-NGO alliance in formation.

## GERMANY

Since the 1960s, the federal government in Germany had jurisdiction over higher education. As a result of the student movement, university reforms and constitutional amendments were introduced (Gellert 1984). Free higher education was one of them.

“In all public schools and universities teaching is free of charge. ...” Admission ... is only to be dependent upon the ability of the student.” (State Law, article 59)

This is a very significant clause as the overwhelming majority of higher education in Germany is provided by public universities. However, since the late 1990s, the center-right endorsed a tuition policy. The most recent revival of the tuition debate can be traced back to the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK) in 1995 (Hüther and Krücken 2014) where it was debated but not endorsed. However, in 1998, Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft and the Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung (CHE) picked up the debate again. They presented a Studienbeitragsmodell (model for a financial contribution to the cost of a degree course) in a joint publication (Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and CHE, 1998) This move coincided

with the student protests against the low quality of teaching and the financial situation of the universities. In a way, tuitions emerged as the neoliberal recipe to increase the quality of higher education in Germany.

The German Employers Association Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) presented a tuition model in 2004. The same year, HRK steps in to argue that tuitions should be an option. (Hüther and Krücken 2014) The tuition endorsement of these two organizations is quite significant given the constant cycles of electoral campaigns at the local level because once the federal option was exhausted, the right opted for a local option. In 2005, the center-right CDU brought the tuition issue to the constitutional court to oppose the federal jurisdiction. It obtained a ruling in favor of state rights. Once states had the right to introduce tuitions, the states that were ruled by conservative governments announced the introduction of tuitions starting from 2006-2007. The center-right, CDU (Christian Democrats) and the FDP (Centrist liberals), favored tuitions in Germany while the center left and the left opposed them at the federal level. In the case of Hesse the right-wing government announced the introduction of tuitions starting from 2006 (Türkoğlu 2019a).

There has been an active collective action scene in Germany where education “strikes”, occupations, and demonstrations have been used relatively frequently by radical left-wing student groups in the 1980s and 1990s against education budget cuts, cancellation of courses, university reforms (Francisco 2006, European Protest and Coercion Data). When the tuitions debate erupted in 2003-05, while some student groups opted for contentious tactics, the majority of student activism focused on symbolic tactics and lobbying efforts (Interview Ger1, Ger3). The collective memory of more contentious student action was to be invoked in the second wave.

Labor unions, in general, have faced with decreasing membership and an unfriendly government in power in Hesse. Despite this overall trend, the education union, Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), was particularly strong compared to other branches in the German states (Turner 2011). In the case of education, the channels of communication between the government and the union was so blocked the union decided to work on shifting the public opinion rather than using traditional lobbying tactics (Turner 2011). This perception of threat and the obstacles for lobbying would eventually motivate the alliance with the student protestors (Türkoğlu 2019a).

Student mobilization in 2003-05 could not stop the introduction of tuitions. CDU under the leadership of Ronald Koch in Hesse, was determined. Tuition fees were finally introduced in October 2006 despite the oppositions (FAZ 2006b, 2006c). GEW continued to oppose tuition, but the bigger union network Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) was focused on opposing the welfare state reforms. Perception of a loss of power would soon motivate DGB to seek broader social movement alliances (Dörre and Nachwey 2019). While the unions deepened their commitment to social movement alliances, student opposition decided to try more confrontational tactics and broaden their alliances to stop tuitions.

“I think the protests after 2006 were much more intense and much more confrontational and weren’t focused on distributing information, talking to politicians, and doing creative stuff but much more focused on disrupting the [daily routine of the] university not symbolically but really. Not only the university but the city as well, like the rail ways, motor ways. That is the reason why there was news coverage where people talk about 2006 as summer of resistance.” (Interview Ger2)

The nation-wide student union, Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss (ASStA), which is organized in every major campus, was also politicized along the way. On some campuses, students refrained from paying the fees to protest. For example, in Marburg one interviewee explained their tactics the following way:

“We were supposed to pay 500 euros a semester. There was a fund created by AStA where you could pay 500 euros but not pay the fees, as a kind of protest. Students could still pay to the AStA account so that no one could ex-matriculate you. It would look like you have paid the fees but the money wouldn’t go to the university, it was a special account.” (Interview Ger14)

In short, the perception of threat on the part of the unions, move to more contentious and assertive tactics on the part of the students paved the way for an alliance between the student groups in Hesse only with the education union but also the general workers union DGB. The alliance was able to keep tuition fees issue as a top priority for the state elections forcing the hand of the government (Türkoğlu 2019a). With an uncharacteristic move, unions announced that they would not vote for a party that insisted on tuition fees. The state election ended up in a hanged parliament with the government losing seats. However, coalition talks failed, elections were repeated. This time, rather than risk a failure, the CDU government announced the abolition of tuition fees in Hesse. Hesse, one of the rickets states in Germany, created a domino effect. In three years, all of the states that experimented with tuition fees abolished them. Despite these gains, many activists felt that they could not achieve enough to stop the tie of the commercialization of higher education (Interview Ger 1, Ger 3, Ger 2, Ger7, Ger 8). Nevertheless, this result shows a fault line in the neoliberal reform packages for higher education in Germany.

## TURKEY

In 1980, a coup d'état happened in Turkey. Before Turkey returned to democracy in 1983, a new constitution was drafted. In this constitution, many political liberties granted by the previous constitution was curtailed because the military leaders that staged the coup blamed the political polarization of the 1970s on those liberties. The student movement of the 1960s were

later radicalized with the clashes between the right-wing and left-wing student movements (Alper 2019) and thus the narrative of violent student clashes used to legitimize the coup. However, for the left-wing students “Denizler” was an important empowering symbol that referred to the execution of three students with the 1971 coup. Not surprisingly, the student movement in the 1980s targeted authoritarian policies of the university administration, the presence of police on campuses (Cumhuriyet, 1989a), acceptance of the students who were dismissed from universities during the coup (Cumhuriyet 1986a), and Higher Education Council (Cumhuriyet, 1986b) that was established to centralize the higher education institutions.

In 1995, the government proposed a tuition hike which would more than double the existing fees as part of the economic stability package (Cumhuriyet 1995). This hike arrived on top of a 50% hike passed the previous year (Cumhuriyet 1994) In response, student organizations mobilized and demanded the abolition of the tuitions once more. Because of the stigma of the violent student protests of the 1970s, which the coup-makers presented as the reason for their intervention, the most prominent student organization at the time, the Student Coordination, decided to endorse horizontal organized with a decidedly less partisan tone. This was part of a tactical move because political student organizations and unions were still illegal at the time.

Strictly speaking, there was no legal ground that made the organization legal. Every campus was supposed to establish its own front. Faculty of Literature front (of Istanbul University), Istanbul Technical University Taşkışla Front etc. You don't have to belong to any specific organization. (...) Of course this was a different time than the 1960s but we could have been as influential nevertheless because everyone was fed up with the fees.(Interview, Tur17)

For some, those tuition hikes were a serious concern over their ability to actually pursue higher education at a time of rampant inflation and economic crisis.

The student movement in the mid-1990s was especially famous for its usage of creative as well as assertive tactics. There were violent clashes with the police as well as non-violent protests that made to the headlines which marked a stark difference compared to the 1960s. They occupied campuses and protested in the National Parliament, which was then illegal. Their arrest triggered a wave of human rights protest in Turkey, which was later combined with protests over arrests of journalist and scandals of corruption. The student mobilization in the 1990s was not able to reverse the tuition hikes, but they opened up a debate about the right to protest because of the harsh prison sentences some of the student protestors received. Student mobilization shifted its course towards joining the democratization movement at the time, but their mobilization vitalized the student movement for the decades to come. Tuition hikes continued. However, the next generation tactically built on the 1990s.

Tuition hikes passed the national parliament under the leadership of both right-wing and left-wing governments in 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999. Carrying the torch of previous generations became a motivator for some activists in the 2000s. This became especially salient when a TV series that narrated the student protests of the 1960s became very popular in Turkey.

“Did you know that I come from a very apolitical family? I was born years after the ’80 coup and for my family it was best not get involved in politics at all. So there was no discussion of history, no talk about what happened back then. But you know.. that TV series...Çemberimde Gül Oya.. that changed everything for me. I got curious. As I read more and talked to my friends who were involved in politics, I just couldn’t ignore inequality. It was our generation’s turn.” (Interview, Tur8)

Student groups continued to protest neoliberalization of higher education and the Higher Education Council, but such protests did not become a large-scale mobilization.

In 2008, students once again mobilized against tuition hikes which were initially proposed to be doubled. This time, the mobilization of the left-wing student activists was backed

by labor union resources (Türkoğlu 2019a). In the early 2000s, left-wing unions shifted to social movement unionism. As the government-backed “friendly” unions and put pressure on the left-wing unions, left-wing unions perceived an existential threat (Erdoğan 2014). This threat motivated them consider alliances with student organizations in higher education as well. The left-wing blue-collar union DİSK helped the establishment of a student/youth union, Genç-sen (Erdoğan 2013) which organized many protests against the neoliberalization of higher education. Secondly, the left-wing white-collar union of KESK that represents public employees supported free tuitions through Eğitim-sen. Eğitim-sen (Education and Science Workers Union) is a member of KESK and had members who were student activists in the past. Former student activists continued their opposition to the commercialization of higher education when they became professors and union members. They played a brokerage role between student organizations and unions. A former student activist and a union leader make the following remark:

“The commodification of higher education actually started in the 1990s. We have started the opposition back then in the 1990s against the tuition hikes. That was a de facto commodification of higher education.. but it went beyond that. The reforms [at the time] also introduced the framework for the universities to function like companies, organize like companies, and create their own resources. [...] What the union did [in 2008-10] was try to connect different groups in universities and provide resources...which was critical this time.” (Interview, Tur 4)

Student activists who took part in 2008-11 mobilization trace their “roots” to the 1990s as well.

“In Turkey, tuition hikes became a burning grievance in the 1990s. Just when I entered the university it started again like [that time] when the government discussed a 300 -500 % increase” (Interview, Tur 12)

“Students have always been an important part of Turkish history. In the 1960s..in the 1990s and now. (...)You know our older brothers [former student activists, no familial relation] then became union members we kept in touch (...)” (Interview, Tur 11)



Student activists from left-wing student organizations acknowledge the support of Eđitim-sen even if they would have liked to see the union get more involved with their mobilization (Interview Tur 12, Tur 11). A shared memory of 1990s activism and the brokerage role of former student activists facilitated alliance building when both the labor unions and the students faced a threat from the government. Protests also found an echo among the unaffiliated students who also organized protests. There were also anti-tuition hike protests organized by right-wing students which were quite unprecedented given the polarized history of student mobilizations in Turkey.

On the eve of elections, the biggest opposition party, the social democrats, endorsed free higher education posing a challenge to AKP in the field of higher education. Following the election, AKP remained in power but lost seats to social democrats. Even if AKP never promised the abolition of tuition fees, the government reversed its own policy and announced that public higher education would be free for the students following a regular track. This outcome demonstrates how the past “failure” of the student mobilization in the 1990s made an impact on the strategic decision making of alliace-building in 2008-11. Instead of joining a pact, student groups turned into alliance building as equals. Both collective memory of the 1960s and 1990s and brokerage of former activists facilitated an alliance between labor unions and students.

## UNITED STATES

In the United States, the legacy of past student activism played a role in how students make sense of racial and social inequality while for some it signified personal liberties (Gitlin 1993, Barlow 1991). However, the latter was perceived to be more of an issue for the white middle class students while the black students involvement in politics has been largely studies

with the broader framework of the civil rights movement or in anti-Vietnam movement (Barlow 1991, Fendrich 2003). Black student activism institutionalized black studies (Rojas 2007) and later the student activism for Chicano studies (Rhoads 1998) highlighted debates around racial diversity and multiculturalism. These precedents may have also reinforced student networks to follow racial lines. This created a fragmented student mobilization field making it more difficult to unite different student groups. Furthermore, the narrative of the impact of the students in the eventful 1960s were also fragmented.

Historically, tuition was free in the public universities in California based on the master plan of the early 1960s. However, in response to the student activism of the 60s, then California governor Ronald Reagan proposed to introduce tuition fees as a punitive measure (Türkoğlu 2019b). Even if the initial proposal did not pass, in the early 1970s, punitive budgetary measures were endorsed in response to student activism (LATimes 1970). The student mobilization focused on urban issues in the 1970s and remained fragmented in the 1980s and 1990s. Public university systems continued to increase tuitions. Similar to the case of Turkey, there has been a student mobilization against tuition hikes, but unlike Turkey it remained fragmented.

Throughout the 1990s, tuition fees increased under republican. In 1991, because of an economic recession and budget cuts, tuitions were increased on average by 12 percent in California's public four-year universities (Gordon 1991). There were small-scale contentious protests at the UC Regents meeting to protest the hikes (Lingren 1991a, Lindgren 1991b), but the student mobilization could not prevent the tuition increases (Watanabe 1991). A year later, the governor proposed a 24 percent fee increase in UC and 40% fee increase at the CSU system in return for not cutting the higher education budget (Trombley and Gordon 1992). Both of the systems increase tuitions (Gordon 1992, Smollar 1992). This time students resorted to lobbying

and letter-writing campaigns to protest the hikes (Cekola 1992). These tactics did not work either. More hikes arrived in 1993 and 1994(Gordon 1993, Di Rado 1994, Ballou and Frammolino ).

The Fragmentation of the 1960s and the perception that the student activism is mainly a matter of white middle class students' mobilization (Barlow 1991) limited the opportunities for alliance building. The students of color were disproportionately affected by the tuition hikes at a time when affirmative action in universities was also being repelled (Quinn 2011). However, their mobilization was not able to build an alliance with labor organizations, which were more focused on issues of migrant status, ethnicity, and class. In Los Angeles, for example, the campaign for Justice for Janitors revived the labor movement in California. However, students were not able to work together with them.

We were able to get people going, pluck into larger efforts ongoing in the city but a lot of unions at the time saw affirmative action more important. I remember talking to someone who was a staff person who worked for justice for janitors. Saying that is a middle-class problem, that is not a working-class problem. (Interview, US 9)

Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s tuitions increased as both republican and democratic governors proposed budget cuts. Another wave of student protests, much bigger this time occurred in response to the tuition hikes in 2008-10 and then in 2011-12. In 2009, the UC Board of Regents increase tuition by 32 percent, students respond by occupying building (O'Leary 2009). Cal State Trustees approved a 10% hike in May and an additional 20% hike in July(Rivera 2015). In 2009-10 there were massive walkouts, a call for a national day of action across campuses to protest tuition hikes both in the UC and CSU systems (LA Times 2010a, LA Times 2010b, LA Times 2010c). Some students sued the Cal state system for breach of contract and "violating its duties of good faith and fair dealing" (Rivera 2015). These protests and legal

action did not overturn tuition hikes. However, these “failures” motivated the students to seek a broader alliance (LA Times 2011a, LA Times 2011b, LA Times 2011c, LA Times 2011d).

This time, the student movement became part of a pact similar to the argument provided by Donatella et al. The perception of fragmentation of the students’ activism in the 1960s limited their ability to pursue alliances similar to the cases of Germany and even Turkey. Student groups in California opted to join an already existing alliance among the education unions and NGOs. With this decision, brokerage played a bigger role in the outcome of the anti-tuition hike movement.

California Federation of Teachers (CFT) took the initiative in 2010 to propose a millionaire’s tax as a remedy to the budget cuts K-12 (Kinder garden to high school) education received. Seeing the ongoing budget cuts, these organizations decided to take assertive action and help change taxation. In California, new tax measures are subject to voters’ approval. In each election cycle, a series of ballot measures that are voted into local law. Initially, California Federation of Teachers together with the progressive NGOs working on education issues, focused on a ballot measure to raise the taxes for the richest residents of California which would then be challenged into public education spending. Through the union networks of American Federation of Teachers (affiliated with AFL-CIO), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which represents most of the university employees, and the United Auto Workers (UAW), which mostly represent graduate students, an alliance between the higher education and K-12 education was negotiated (Interview US 3,US 8, US9,US 12,US 14). In 2012, while the broader coalition prepared a ballot measure to increase the education spending, unions also provided resources for the mobilization of students in favor of the ballot measure.

That march on Sacramento [March 2012], we had people speak at that march, leaders of the American Federation of Teachers and the Courage Campaign. We raised the money

from the California Nurses Association from AFSCME [American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees] from UAW [United Auto Workers] from American Federation of Teachers to bus the students there so it was this larger societal coalition. (Interview, US3)

Former student activists played a brokerage role between the unions and the student groups (Interview US3, US4, US12).

The alliance for the ballot initiative pushed the state legislature to include the tuition freezes as a condition of the state budget (Interview US 3, LA Times 2012b). The measure passed. The involvement of the unions played a decisive role in the ballot measure that leads to a tuition freeze, they organized the assertive action and brokered an alliance between different interest groups K-12 and higher education. When the ballot measure passed and the taxes were increased in order to increase the budget reserved for education, tuitions in public universities were also frozen for five years. The positions former student activists took in the unions led to the formation of organic ties with some of the unions and the student groups. This case shows how failed mobilizations could motivate student groups to seek broader alliances and how perceptions of the events in the 1960s could influence the student groups decisions to join pacts rather than forming higher education focused alliances. Unlike the case of Turkey, in the case of California collective memory did not refer to the mobilization in the '90s or the '60s.

## CONCLUSION

At the turn of the millennium, multiple countries erupted in student protests against tuition hikes in public universities. In this chapter, I analyzed three unlikely cases that have not attracted much spotlight in the international press: Germany, Turkey, and the United States. The

“success” of all three cases was built on the opportunities and limitation of a previous wave that ended in “failure.”

Past “failures” become a building block in two ways: through the possibility of personal investment based on one’s own experience that turn into a brokerage role and through the empowering narrative of agency based on collective remembering of the 1960s. Previous studies highlighted the importance of analyzing the structural opportunities and constraints organizational fields embody as well as the motivations for alliance building among different social movement organizations. Studies that focus on student mobilization tend to look at the past mobilizations mostly in extensive case studies and rarely in comparative work. Using the theoretical framework of the collective memory of eventful transitions in democratization, I show that in addition to the structural constraints and opportunities, the selectivity of collective memory work mediates these constraints and opportunities of alliance building.

A key implication for this study, is that future research should go beyond the successful instances of mobilization especially in comparative work and consider the legacies of past mobilizations. Research would benefit from more precise modeling of how past “failures” enable and constrain alliance building across different political contexts in interaction with different collective memory narratives. The intersection of alliance building capacity (structural opportunities and constraints) and the motivators for alliance building (based on brokerage initiatives, collective memory work, threat perceptions) is also critical in further research to better understand variation in movement outcomes.

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