Introduction

Thanks in large part to the seminal contribution of North and Weingast (1989), the Glorious Revolution of 1688 is widely believed to be an institutional watershed.[1] North and Weingast contend that, in sweeping away royal absolutism in favor constitutional monarchy, Parliament was also able to commit to "responsible" behavior that benefited the British people. They provide a number of reasons of why. Regular Parliaments allowed a natural diversity of views to contend in the formulation of policy. The supply of private benefits at public cost was restrained because government required the cooperation of the Crown, Parliament and Courts. The politically dominant Whig coalition was commercially minded, preferring limited government and secure property rights. Finally, a politically independent judiciary limited potential abuses by Parliament. These factors allow them to credit the revolution with restraining governmental abuses, establishing commitments to protect individual rights, and laying the groundwork for a secularized state. The "first modern revolution" thus laid the foundation for a secular, capitalist society governed by the rule of law (Pincus 2009).

But did the revolution really prevent the new parliamentary regime from abusing its power, thereby laying the groundwork for British liberty? The ``Whig interpretation'' of history is a tendency to view the progression of British constitutionalism as the triumph of liberty and

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[1] The historiography of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688-1690 is vast, particularly if seen through a Three Kingdom perspective that considers how England (and Wales) shaped events in the Stuart's Scottish and Irish kingdoms and vice versa. It is clear that contemporary historiography has cast off the teleology of the Whiggish perspective and it more apt to examine interdependencies between events in England and the rest of Britain (see, e.g., the essays collected in Harris and Taylor 2013). Given our paper's limited focus on the claims made by social scientists regarding its influence on religious politics, the historiography of the Glorious Revolution is simply too vast for us to provide a detailed examination of its evolution.

enlightenment (Butterfield 1931). Despite having shed the teleological assumptions of the old school of thought, we contend that some of the prevailing interpretations of the Revolution in the social sciences may still be too Whiggish. Specifically, we challenge the assumption that the Revolution unleashed a gradual and progressive secularization of the state that resulted in freedom for religious minorities.

Based upon the contemporary historiography of religious politics in the Three Kingdoms of Great Britain in the era of the Glorious Revolution, we argue that the depiction of Britain as secularizing and generally advancing religious liberties as a consequence of 1688 into question (Clark 2000, 2012; Harris 1993, 1999, 2006; Miller 1997; Raffe 2010; 2018; Stephen 2010) . Rather than generally repressing "irresponsible" (meaning injurious to the public good) governmental behavior, we argue that consequences of the changes brought about by the Revolution depended largely on which side of the Jacobite-Williamite conflict a group stood on during the events of 1688-1690. Whereas groups that were part of the winning Williamite coalition reaped the rewards of victory and saw an expansion of their liberties, whereas those who those that were on the losing Jacobite side could count on little protection and were in jeopardy of being oppressed by the Parliamentary regime. In the centrally important domain of religious politics, those churches and sects that were part of the winning Williamite coalition (including Anglican Tory defectors from James II, Protestant Dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians) improved their position and enhanced their public influence while a host of restrictions and disabilities fell upon on the losers (Catholics and non-Trinitarian believers in England, Episcopalians and Dissenting Protestants in Scotland, the Catholic majority in Ireland, among others) (Harris 1993; 2006; Miller 1997; Raffe 2010; 2018; Stephen 2010).

Moreover, the new Williamite regime after 1688 relied on an alliance with state-established churches as did the royal absolutism of the Stuarts (Clark 2000, 2012; Harris 1993, 1999, 2006; Hempton 1996). The new power equilibrium supporting the Williamite coalition not only favored Whig politicians, overseas merchants, and the commercial and banking interests but also favored its clients in the established Churches of England and Ireland, as well as the established Presbyterian-controlled Church of Scotland. Although some Protestant sects in England benefited from qualified toleration, the established churches were material beneficiaries of parliamentary rule: between 1688 and 1801, the real incomes of the highest officials (lords) of the Church of England nearly doubled (Greif and Rubin 2015: 13). In Scotland, the new regime certainly benefited Scottish Presbyterians, who had been forceful allies of the Parliamentary faction during the Civil War and who had supported the overthrow and exile of the Stuart King James II (James VII in Scotland) in favor of the Protestant co-regency of William III and Mary II. The new regime was one in which Presbyterian power was established in the kirk by the Scottish Parliament and, after the union of England and Scotland, a militant Calvinist ideology backed by Whig power continued to dominate Scottish politics and society well into the 19th Century.

As a result, for a century after 1688 the conditions that obtained for most religious groups outside the established churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland remained unfavorable, when not blatantly repressive. Indeed, to some extent, the Revolution halted a movement toward greater religious pluralism in British public life. The religious policy of the last deposed Stuart, James II, effectively granted religious liberty to his subjects through the Act of Indulgence in 1687 (CITE Raffe ETC). Parliament reversed this in the wake of the Revolution. Although it

passed the Act of Toleration (1689) which allowed Dissenting Trinitarian Protestants the right to worship in England, Parliament reaffirmed the prerogatives of the established churches in the Three Kingdoms making up Great Britain (Field 2008). Whereas, the Glorious Revolution In Scotland, the consequences were severe; "the established Church was violently reformed by William III on Presbyterian lines after the Revolution" (Clark 2000: 40) and rather than winning the peace through greater toleration and secularization of politics, the new regime faced the constant threat of armed rebellion from 1689 onward. The Highland rebellion of 1689-1691, an attempted French landing in support of rebels in 1708, and three Jacobite wars in 1715, 1719 and 1745 gained much of their support from members of the religious groups discriminated against by the new regime (Harris 1993: 208-29; Raffe 2012; RAFFE etc.). In Ireland, the overthrow of James II led directly to a bitter civil war pitting Jacobite forces, backed by the majority of the Catholic population, against Williamite forces backed by the Protestant minority. The victorious Williamite coalition passed a series of penal acts that effectively dispossessed the Catholic elite, established an Anglican church in Ireland, and imposed harsh restrictions on Catholics and sectarian Protestants alike. In effect, the Glorious Revolution cemented rule of the Anglo "Protestant ascendancy" over an Irish colony (Harris 2003: 422-76.

To test our argument, we examine whether the Revolution imposed constraints on Parliament. It may be tempting to limit one's perspective on the consequences of the Glorious Revolution to the English case but the historical development of Britain was shaped by the political incorporation of its Celtic fringes. As historian J.C.D. Clark (1989: 228) observes, "England's distinctiveness is best understood through her impact on her neighbors." In Scotland, religious contention before 1688 had been especially militant and politically destabilizing but religious politics afterward remained so. Although our general argument also applies to England,

in seeking to understand the implications of the Revolution, we focus on religious liberties in the important case of Scotland, which was part of the domain of William and Mary after 1688 and ruled directly by Westminster after the Acts of Union in 1707. In particular, the Scottish case shines light on three components of the debate that have received limited attention: first the role of religious monopolies in the new regime; second, the lack of restraint on Parliament and the importance of being part of the Revolution's winning coalition; and, third, the role that religious oppression played in destabilizing British politics for five decades after 1688.

In advancing this our argument, we are not attempting to impose an ahistorical standard of religious toleration on Britain after 1688. All early modern states, to varying extents, imposed religious monopolies and restricted minorities (Johnson and Koyama 2019). Rather, we are arguing that the Glorious Revolution did not lead Britain toward a general commitment to religious liberty. One might also object that the Scottish case should not be used to falsify arguments about Britain generally because Scotland had a different political culture, or was more homogeneous in religious terms, or faced a more serious problem of Jacobitism. However, this artificial separation of Scotland from Britain has permitted scholars focusing on England to ignore the Scottish experience as if England and Scotland were under different rulers and, after 1707, different Parliaments. Jacobitism was a perennial problem in Scotland precisely because of religious repression. Political institutions are credible and have bite precisely because they are expected to secure general advantages across the groups comprising the polity.

Based on historical evidence and a systematic examination of ecclesiastical legislation introduced by the dominant rulers (Crown or Parliament) from 1560 (introduction of Episcopacy) to 1864 (equal treatment to Episcopalians and Presbyterians), we test our claims to show that the Revolution was not an institutional watershed in the context of religion or religious

liberty. Legislation was biased toward the Scottish Episcopalians during the reign of the Crown but was similarly biased toward the Presbyterians during the reign of Parliament. Political secularization, that is, the transition toward equitable treatment of religious groups under law, came about much later in the 19th century when the Presbyterians faced multiple successions from the established kirk and franchise extensions increased the political representation of other denominations (especially non-conforming Protestants) and religions. These transformations, rather than new institutions, forced subsequent Parliaments to retreat from repression and enact legislation to reduce restrictions on these denominations.

Credible Commitment in the Religious Sphere

North and Weingast (1989) argue that the institutional innovation brought about by the Glorious Revolution constrained the Crown, compelling it to obey procedural rules and respect property rights. The Crown's "credible commitment" to limited government, which furthered the interests of capital, contributed to England's future economic growth. As North and Weingast state their central claims:

> As Parliament represented wealth holders, its increased role markedly reduced the King's ability to renege. Moreover, the institutional structure that evolved after 1688 did not provide incentives for Parliament to replace the Crown and itself engage in similar irresponsible behavior (North and Weingast 1989: 804).

The commitment problem in the context of religious liberty is derivative of the argument that the English Revolution of 1688 forced the Crown to commit to uphold property rights and constrained the Crown's irresponsible tax and debt policies. The new constitutional arrangements

ensured that the Parliament could veto the Crown's policies. As a result, the Crown could no longer impinge on individual rights (for a forceful criticism of this aspect of the North and Weingast thesis, see Pincus and Robinson 2014).

The North and Weingast paper has become an important touchstone for historical debates on Britain's institutional development.[1] Critics suggest that property rights were protected before 1688 and point toward the underlying power equilibrium in England as a source of the credible commitment to limit government and respect property rights. Much of the recent literature has also re-specified the institutional argument in which the *de-jure* institutions of the Revolution were maintained by *de-facto* power of the Whig coalition in the Parliament. Stasavage (2002) argues that enhanced institutional credibility was brought about due to partisan control, and the emergence of cross-issue coalitions. The members of the strong Whig coalition in Parliament that could veto issuance of Crown debt were also creditors to the government. Pincus and Robinson (2014) argue that the Revolution brought about government by partisan ministries instead of royal councilors, resulting in a steady expansion of the bureaucratic and revenue-collecting functions of the state. Cox (2012) specifies the precise institutional constraint that limited the Crown's ability to borrow and tax --- a parliamentary veto. Whereas the Revolution imposed control over the state's fiscal-military component, institutional reform did not extend to royal patronage in civil administration allowing the "old corruption" to flourish. Parliament's unwillingness to fund such patronage hindered the bureaucratization of the British state well into the 19th century (Cox 2018).

Although all of these corrections cast doubt on the central mechanisms identified by North and Weingast, they share the notion that, by increasing parliamentary power, the Revolution made government more responsible and laid the groundwork for the Industrial

Revolution. But what does this have to do with religion? Related studies have emphasized how the Revolution established a parliamentary supremacy that opened the way for political secularization and religious freedom. Greif and Rubin (2015) argue that the Revolution cemented a transition by which the British state shifted from sacred claims to the rule of law and parliamentary consent. This change in the assertion of legitimacy advanced the country toward secularism and democracy. Gill (2008: 89) hails the Toleration Act of 1689 as a "milestone" in the history of religious liberty because it allegedly reduced religious conflict in favor of pragmatic considerations. Johnson and Koyama (2019: 174-9) see the Revolution as a major step toward the reduction of religious influence in government and the triumph of general rules over older sectarian "identity-rules".

North and Weingast's(1989) original concern was primarily with the institutional conditions for economic growth emerging from credible commitments that limit government abuses of power and secure property rights. An important but less widely evaluated corollary is that the Revolution restrained Parliament, not just the Crown, from abuse of power and irresponsible trespass on individual freedoms. In fact, North and Weingast (1989: 804, 817) are clear on this point: they claim that the institutional structure which evolved after 1688 did not provide incentives for Parliament to ``engage in similarly irresponsible behavior'' as had the Crown, because of the ``natural diversity of views in a legislature.'' This putative diversity raised the cost of supplying private benefits -- such as the maintenance of a monopoly church -- through regulation. Supplying private benefits at public cost also required cooperation of the Crown, Parliament and courts. The commercially minded Whig coalition preferred limited government and limited political interference in economic affairs. Finally, the creation of a politically independent judiciary limited potential abuses by the Parliament.[2]

Greif and Rubin (2015) rightly note that religious politics were at the very center of the Revolution. It was not the insecurity of property or the impotence of Parliament that inspired the rebellion against James II but the birth of a Catholic heir and policies that seemed to be removing disabilities on Catholics. As they argue, ``The direct cause of the Glorious Revolution was not financial but religious.   Parliament refused James's demand to grant toleration to Catholics (Greif and Rubin 2015: 35)." The Stuarts, according to this line of reasoning, sought an alternative basis for legitimacy from Parliament in a renewed alliance with the Catholic faith. Their ultimate failure ensured that secular politics would prevail. This interpretation makes the Revolution an extension of the "secularizing" religious politics that began with the Protestant Reformation (Becker, Pfaff and Rubin 2016).

Rather than yielding a general advance of religious liberties, however, we argue that the institutional legacy of the Revolution was biased in favor of those groups that were part of the winning coalition --- long-distance merchants, Dissenting Trinitarian Protestants, and Scottish Presbyterians. As Ogilvie and Carus (2014: 429) note, the institutional changes which promote general welfare are those ``whose rules apply uniformly to everyone in society, regardless of their identity or membership in particular groups." In their comparative study of religious politics in early modern Europe, Johnson and Koyama (2019) strongly reinforce this point, showing that identity-based inclusion rules retard effective government.

The Revolution did bring about institutional constraints on religious politics, but only on the behavior of the Crown. First, it established Church-Crown, if not, Church-State, separation. The Claim of Right limited the Crown's control over state-run churches by dissolving the Ecclesiastical Commission setup by James II to control the Church of England. Secondly, it

9

prevented a Catholic from taking the throne and barred the king from appointing Catholics to offices in the Church or government. In Scotland, all of the Episcopal bishops appointed by the Stuarts were removed from the Church of Scotland, thereby reversing the Crown's previous policy of episcopacy. The ability to influence tax and debt revenues using ecclesiastical nominations was also limited because of the Parliamentary vetoes on the Crown's debt and tax policies.

Was the revolution similarly successful in resolving the commitment problem of the Parliament in the context of religious politics? Legislatures do not naturally contain a diversity of views but can be captured by particular interests set upon advancing narrow or rent-seeking objectives instead of "responsible" government (Ogilvie and Carus 2014). The historical record suggests that in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Church and state remained interdependent institutions of British governance. Indeed, Whiggish defenders of the new regime claimed the established churches provided the foundation for a ``fair and beautiful constitution''; not less than the ``finest government under heaven'' (Hempton 1996: 13). Nevertheless, as much as it was portrayed as ``sacred barrier'' protecting British freedoms, the tax-supported religious establishment served narrower interests. Whig patronage helped to secure ecclesiastical appointments and preferment in Scotland and England. Attendance at established church services were legally required and membership remained a condition for public office well into the 19th century (Field 2008). Despite growing religious pluralism in Britain, a confessional state prevailed in which ecclesiastical power was monopolized by the established churches for almost two centuries after the Revolution (Clark 2000: 40).

The conditions for religious liberty were worst for religious minorities and outside of England. In Scotland, Parliament established Presbyterian control over the Scottish kirk and

suppressed Episcopalians and Catholics. In Ireland, laws penalizing the local Catholic majority remained in place or were strengthened while the Anglican Church of Ireland, serving a privileged minority, was upheld. Throughout the Three Kingdoms of Great Britain, Parliament denied Catholic civil rights entirely and only fully granted them in 1829. The emancipation of the Jews would have to wait until 1858.

Gains in religious liberty were limited. Although the Act of Toleration for Dissenting sects improved the conditions of non-establishment Protestants in England (and inadvertently undermined the enforcement of mandatory Sunday attendance, see Field 2008), religion remained politicized, the Church of England's ecclesiastical monopoly remained unchallenged, and little was done to advance religious freedom elsewhere in Britain. We will show that the partial secularization of the state and expanding religious liberties progressed gradually from the late 18th century onward --- nearly a century after the Revolution --- but for reasons other than the new institutional arrangement.

Religious Factionalism under the Stuarts

The Stuart dynasty ruled Scotland for the most period from 1371 until the Revolution of 1688. Following the Scottish Reformation, the Stuart King James VI was crowned James I of England and conformed to the Church of England. In Scotland, he asserted Episcopacy, a policy of emulating the reforms of the Church of England through the royal appointment of higher church officials. Consequently, the power and influence of the Presbyterians on the established Church of Scotland was checked despite strong Calvinist leanings among Scottish Protestants.

Scots had regarded the ecclesiastical establishment prior to the 1550s as highly corrupt (Wormald 1981). Bishops and abbots filled important judicial, revenue and diplomatic positions (Hetherington 1851, 25). James V appointed members of the royal family to lucrative positions in the Church to extract taxes, while neglecting the lower level parishes. The movement for reform began in the 1520s. In 1527, the Lutheran Patrick Hamilton returned from the continent and promoted the reform the Scottish Church. In 1529 he was burnt at the stake for heresy. The Calvinist John Knox returned to Scotland in 1544 and began preaching for the reform of the Church. In 1560, the Scottish Parliament overthrew the Catholic queen-regent and followed England's path toward Reformation by abolishing Catholicism and instituting a new state church on the Anglican model.

Knox had conceived a Presbyterian-like structure for the reformed Church and in 1574, Andrew Melville brought Calvinist models to Scotland from Geneva. They would replace bishops with a hierarchy of church courts. In 1578, Calvinists instituted Presbyteries throughout Scotland which laid the roots of a divided Scottish kirk; one faction, Presbyterian and more congregational, and, the other, Episcopal, and more hierarchical in the mode of the English compromise between the Protestant faith and Catholic hierarchy. Besides their different understanding of ecclesiology, the conflict between the two was fostered by the evolution of very different confessional cultures that polarized Scottish society (Raffe 2010a).

James VI (also James I of England) intended to settle the issue of Presbyterianism for the last time by driving a wedge between the moderate Protestants (Episcopals) and the puritan radicals (Presbyterians) (Fincham and Lake 1985; Lee 1974). James's first major decision as the Supreme Governor of the Church of England was to summon a conference of divines and politicians to Hampton Court in January 1604 to resolve the matter. He made clear that Scotland

should follow an Anglican model. The moderates would be incorporated into the Scottish kirk

and the extremists repressed. James VI twice stated the maxim ``No bishop, no king'' to

underline his complete hostility toward Presbyterianism, expressed in the Black Acts (which

condemned Presbyteries and confirmed Episcopacy) and the removal of radical Presbyterian

ministers from positions of influence (Thomson 1894).

James VI clearly promoted an ideological conflict between the Crown and the

Presbyterians in the established Scottish kirk. Esme Stuart, the Duke of Lennox (1542-1583) is

largely considered to have influenced the King's early political views, and among other things,

impressed the maxim ``An independent kirk and an absolute throne could not co-exist in the

same realm'' (Wylie 1899). The Episcopal structure favored by the Crown was, in effect, a

compromise between the previous order and the new order. Bishops, a Catholic legacy,

continued to hold their positions. The Crown used the influence of the Bishops to extract taxes

and to impose an Anglican liturgy and catechism meant to restrain the puritan zeal of sectarian

Presbyterians.

From the 16th century through the Revolution of 1688, sectarian conflict raged in

Scotland. On one side were the Presbyterian "Convenanters" who swore to uphold and protect

Calvinism, and, on the other, the Episcopalians backed by the Crown. The conflict repeatedly

erupted into mob violence, assassinations and rebellion.

The sectarian conflict within Scottish Protestantism was so savage, in part, because the

preferences of the Crown mattered in the theological, financial, and political activities of the

Scottish kirk. Unrestrained Crown preferences led to liturgical impositions that offended

Calvinists. For instance, during the ``Eleven Years Tyranny'' Charles I (King of Scotland from

1625 to 1649) sought stricter implementation of the Five Articles of Perth.[3] Crown preferences

also influenced access to state resources and positions. Charles I appointed pro-Anglican bishops to key positions of power such as privy counselors and commissioners of the exchequer (Mullan 1986: 173).[4]   In 1634, all bishops began receiving commissions as justices of peace.

Charles I's intensive suppression of Presbyterianism resulted in the Bishop Wars of 1639 between him and the Scottish Covenanters. The English Parliament, suppressed under the personalist rule of Charles I (``Eleven-year tyranny''), joined hands with the Presbyterians. The result was the English Civil War in which the forces of the Crown battled the English and Scottish Parliaments. Scottish Parliamentary forces captured Charles I and began negotiating the establishment of Presbyterianism as the official denomination of the Church of Scotland. A faction then attempted to restore Charles I. It was intercepted and Charles I was handed over to the English and executed for treason by the Rump Parliament.

During the Interregnum (1649-1660), when England pronounced a republic under Oliver Cromwell, the English Parliament did not make Presbyterianism the official denomination of the Church of Scotland. The death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658 and an accession crisis led to the restoration of Charles II (1660-1685). Charles II favored the Episcopal faction and attempted to introduce religious freedoms for Catholics. The increasing tolerance toward Catholics led to a divide in the Parliament (pro-exclusion Whigs and anti-exclusion Tories). The Whigs and the Scottish Presbyterians, again, became natural allies against Charles II. Charles II sided with the Tories and suppressed the Whigs. After Charles II's death, James VII (James II in England, reigned 1685-1688) acceded the throne and continued granting religious liberties to the Catholics, for instance by the suspension of the Test Acts.

When Parliament opposed James's religious policy, he responded by dissolving Parliament and appointed Catholics to high-ranking positions in the army and government. In

1688, the birth of James Edward Stuart, a Catholic heir to the Kingdom, led to a political crisis. In response, a faction of Protestant Whigs requested the Dutch Prince of Orange (William III), whose Stuart wife Mary, had been James's heir, to invade England. When William III arrived with a large army, many of James' Protestant officers defected and the king fled to France, leading to the largely bloodless Revolution of 1688. The outcome united the English Whigs and the Scottish Presbyterians in the winning coalition. The demand for limited monarchy remained the ideological cement that under girded their ongoing alliance against the Tory royalists and Jacobites. The Jacobites (after Jacobus, the Latinized from of James), who supported James VII, were excluded politically but retained Highland strongholds.

After acceding the Crown along with Mary II, William III summoned a Convention of the Estates of Scotland, comprising clergy and nobles. The Convention was dominated by Presbyterians and Whigs (Harris 1990), who offered the Crown of Scotland to William and Mary in return for restoring Presbyterianism as the official denomination of the Church of Scotland. The Settlement was complete in 1690.

The English Parliament and Scottish Presbyterians: The Revolution's Winning Coalition

Prior to the Glorious Revolution, the Presbyterians periodically negotiated with the Crown for more favorable conditions in the established Scottish kirk. For instance, following the War of the Three Kingdoms (the British Civil Wars, 1639-1651), the Presbyterians had expected the reinstated king, Charles II (1660-1685) to restore Presbyterianism, based on prior agreement. ``All the Presbyterian clergy hoped that Charles would respect the Solemn League and Covenant

of 1643 and the oaths he had taken to uphold it in 1650. They were to be disappointed" (Davies and Hardacre 1962).

Indicating the Crown's commitment problem in the religious sphere, Charles II reneged on his promise and decided to restore the Episcopacy in 1661-62. Prior to this, all previous attempts by an Anglican Crown to accommodate a Presbyterian Church had failed. Although the king persecuted many Presbyterians into returning to the established Church, a permanent political agreement governing the Scottish kirk could not be reached so long as the Stuarts were committed to securing their rule in Scotland through an episcopal religious policy. The confrontation ended with the Revolution when the Protestants William and Mary began their rule and were able to abolish bishops and restore Presbyterianism by the Act of Settlement in 1690.

In the period after the Revolution, the Presbyterians, as party to the new ruling coalition in the Scots Parliament, literally suppressed Episcopacy with a vengeance (Raffe 2010b). In the Claim of Right of 1689 (the Scottish equivalent of the Bill of Rights) the Scottish Parliament condemned Episcopacy and in subsequent laws described the Presbyterian Church as the `True Church of Christ' (RPS 1700, 1702, 1703; Raffe 2010). Apart from legal instruments, the early years of the Revolution also saw mob violence against Episcopalians. Crowds, mostly led by radical Presbyterian factions ("rabblings"), attacked Catholic and Episcopal clergy, forcibly ejecting them and their supporters from their homes and places of worship (Harris 1999).

The church-state reforms brought about by the Claim of Right substantially reduced the influence of the Crown. Soon after the 1690 Settlement, King William's attempt to compel the Presbyterians to receive the Episcopalians into full ministerial membership of the Church failed.

The English Whig coalition in alliance with the Scottish Presbyterians agreed in their view of a limited Crown. However, Parliament was not similarly limited. Acting through their influence on the Scottish Parliament, the Presbyterians in practice were far from doctrines of limited government and limited political interference in the realm of religion. The Presbyterians enforced severe restrictions on Episcopalians and Catholics in Scotland.

The independent judiciary is usually cited as an example of constraint on post-1688 government but it did not prevent the Presbyterian suppression of Episcopalians. The Parliament secured its interests through legislation, not through arbitrary appointments or extra-legal mandates, as had the Stuarts. The commercially minded Whig coalition had no interest in moderating the Episcopal suppression through new legislation. The Whigs and the Presbyterians were committed allies against the Episcopalians and the Royalists (Whatley 2006). William's difficulties in securing support for his governments in the Scottish Parliament led him to favor its elimination through a formal union of England and Scotland, a policy achieved by his successor, Queen Anne in 1707 (Riley 1979). A united Parliament that included forty-five Scottish members proved no more interested in restraining Presbyterian abuses than had its predecessors.

Predictably, the punitive religious politics in Scotland (as well as in England and Ireland) provided little incentive for Episcopalians and Catholics to accept the new Williamite regime after 1688 or the Hanoverian succession in 1714. Rather, a Jacobite coalition, comprising Catholics, Episcopalians and English Tory royalists, repeatedly attempted to restore the exiled Stuarts to the English and Scottish (and Irish) Crowns. After the Revolution of 1688, the Jacobites staged four uprisings --- 1708, 1715, 1719 and 1745, and were involved in five plots to change the government --- 1703, 1706, 1717, 1723 and 1753 (Macinnes 2007). The Jacobite

threat to the Parliamentary regime was substantial and ongoing until Hanoverian forces finally defeated the rebels at the Battle of Culloden in 1746.

Episcopal support for the Scottish Jacobites resulted partly from their ouster from positions of authority in favor of Presbyterians following the Settlement of 1689. A minority of the Episcopalians tried to secure religious tolerance through institutional means. Queen Anne supported a compromise Act of Toleration in 1712, which recognized Episcopal Communion under the condition that the clergy would use the English Prayer book and take the Oath of Abjuration of James VII (James II in England), thus proclaiming the legitimacy of the 1688 revolution. A large proportion of Episcopalians refused to renounce their allegiances in 1693 and remained unreconciled in 1712. They were the cement of Scottish Jacobitism; Macinnes (2007) estimates that 75% of Jacobites were unreconciled Episcopalians.

Inevitably, rebellion intensified the repression. Following the 1715 uprising, the Penal Acts of 1719 forbade Episcopal clergy from officiating in the presence of more than nine persons beyond their households, and imposed six-month prison terms on those who would not take an Oath of Allegiance to George I. The Penal Acts of 1746, following the uprising of 1745, forbade Episcopal clergy to officiate without an Oath of Allegiance to George and Oath of Abjuration to the Stuarts. Further acts in 1748 forbade Episcopal clergy from officiating in the presence of more than four persons. The Habeas Corpus Act was repeatedly suspended in Scotland: in 1715 (six months), 1716 (six months), 1722 (one year), 1744 (six months) and 1745 (one year), each time because of the Jacobite uprisings.

The death of Charles Stuart, the last serious Jacobite pretender, in 1788 finally prompted the Scottish Episcopalians to acknowledge the Hanoverian Crown. Some Penal Laws were repealed in 1792, though the Episcopalians were still barred from ministering in the established

Churches of Scotland and England (Hillerbrand 2004, 258). Although it did not avert Jacobite rebellions, in the end Presbyterian repression of the Episcopalians succeeded in crushing Anglican Protestantism in Scotland. Over the course of the 18th century the Episcopalian clergy declined from 1,000 to less than 50 members, with just four bishops (Webley-Parry 1879, 470). The suppression and near disappearance of Episcopal clergy led Walter Scott in 1815 to refer to them as ``The Episcopal Church of Scotland --- the shadow of a shade...'' (Scott 1815: 213). It was not until 1864 -- nearly two centuries after the Revolution -- that the Parliament abolished the remaining disabilities imposed upon Scottish Episcopalians and the Church of England allowed full communion and interchangeability of clergy with the Scottish Episcopalians.

In sum, when it came to religious policy, Parliament was `irresponsibly' biased toward the Presbyterians. The ideology of the Whig-Presbyterian coalition aligned the men who dominated the Church of Scotland with the British Parliament (Allan 1998). This secured neither religious liberty nor the peace; the new regime's suppression of all non-Presbyterians and the enthronement of a sectarian Scottish kirk fostered ongoing conflict and political instability. Although the Revolution had different implications for political and religious liberties in England than in Scotland, this was reason having little to do with the Revolution. The English Parliament was limited in its ability to introduce radical measures due to its bicameral structure. Moderates in the Upper House could also frustrate proposals of the Lower House dominated by the Whigs. However, until 1707 Scotland's Parliament had a unicameral structure, largely controlled by the Whigs and the Presbyterians, with no restraint on their actions.

After the union of 1707, the English Parliament, also largely controlled by the Whigs, remained interested in supporting the Presbyterians because the Jacobites represented the alternative power in Scotland. If the Presbyterians were to lose control, the Jacobite royalists

would bolster the strength of the English Tories (royalists) and tilt the balance against the Whigs. Thus the effect of the Revolution on religion was a component of the equilibrium balance on power on other dimensions. Institutional trade-offs across issue areas led to institutional variation, in this case, stricter discipline on debt and taxes but weaker discipline on religion. These trade-offs were determined by the interests of the coalition empowered by the Revolution. It is likely that in another environment, perhaps led by religious leaders, the equilibrium could have been the opposite, resulting in stricter discipline in religious affairs and weaker discipline on debt and taxes (Rubin 2017).

Analyzing Institutional Bias through Legislation

The narrative evidence provides support for our proposition that the Glorious Revolution failed to restrict repressive policies by Parliament in the religious sphere and that the advantages enjoyed or disabilities born by the members of religious groups depended largely whether they were part of the winning coalition of Whigs, Presbyterians, and Puritan sects which prevailed in 1688.

However, to test our claim systematically, we need to evaluate Scottish religious legislation in the Scottish Parliament and, from 1707, Westminster. To prove our argument, we need to demonstrate that periods of Crown control were also the periods during which Presbyterians were suppressed and the periods of Parliament control were typically the periods during which Episcopalians were suppressed. The institutional means of suppression were mainly legislative enactments that imposed restrictions on the functioning of the opposite church faction. Table 1 lists all Acts relating to Episcopacy passed by the Crown or the Parliament from

1560 until 1890. By categorizing legislation based on its degree of religious suppression, it is possible to elicit the extent of institutional bias during this period.

Insert Table 1 here

We used the following coding procedure. To code institutional bias towards Episcopacy, equal treatment is coded as 0, negative bias with negative values and positive bias with positive values. The analysis begins with the year of equal treatment t (1864) and move backwards. If the legislation at t-1 led to less equal treatment of Episcopacy in relation to Presbyterianism than the legislation at t, we subtract one from the bias score of the period between t and t-1. If the legislation at t-1 led to more equal treatment than the legislation at t, we add one to the bias score of the period between t and t-1.

In 1840, the Parliament repealed previous prohibitions on Episcopacy, but the repeals did not bring about complete equality so the period from 1840 to 1863 is coded as -1. The legislation in 1792 repealed some prohibitions on Episcopacy but did not bring about the level of equality of 1840, we code the period from 1792 to 1839 as -2. In 1748, the Parliament imposed Penal laws on the Episcopalians, which increased the level of repression after 1748. We code the period from 1748 to 1791 as -3. In 1746, Penal Laws were legislated but they were not as stringent as those in 1748. This is an improvement but not as positive as the state of affairs in 1792. Hence the value for years between 1746 and 1747 should be between 1792 and 1839(-3) and 1748-1791(-2) which is averaged at -2.5. We proceed in a similar fashion until 1689, where the value

is -3. If -3 represents abolishing Episcopacy, 0 represents equal treatment, 3 has to represent the opposite of -3 i.e. exclusive monopoly. We code the years in which the Crown designated the Episcopacy to be the exclusive Government of the Church as 3. However, during the Interregnum, when Charles I was deposed and the Parliament controlled Scotland, Episcopacy was abolished. Again, this period is coded as -3.

Insert Figure 1 here

The legislation presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 makes clear that during the reign of the Crown, Episcopalians received favorable treatment, whereas during the reign of the Parliament and until the beginning of the 19th century Episcopalians were worse off. It was only in 1864 that Episcopacy and Presbyterianism received equal treatment, though the beginnings of equitable treatment are observable in 1792 with the Scottish Episcopalian Relief Act.

What Explains Expanding Religious Liberty in the 19th Century?

Like the Scottish Episcopalians, British Catholics and the Jews faced repression through legislative and informal means for a century or more after the Revolution. Liberalization and political secularization came about very slowly (Clark 2012).

The Test Act of 1678 excluded Catholics from both houses of Parliament and from holding government offices and military commissions. The Revolution retained these restriction

in spite of a largely Catholic population in Ireland and Catholic minorities in the other two kingdoms. The Papists Act of 1778 provided partial relief, allowing Catholics to maintain schools, inherit land and purchase property. In 1791, The Roman Catholic Relief Act extended franchise to Catholics who were large landholders. Together, these Acts, through property and franchise, institutionalized the conditions for the increasing political power of Catholic constituencies. In 1823, Daniel O'Connell established the Catholic Association to campaign for complete emancipation. He contested in the 1828 elections, won, but was not allowed to take his seat in the House of Commons. In 1829, the movement allowing Catholics to become Members of Parliament was successful when O'Connell won the second time and Parliament passed the Roman Catholic Relief Act.

The representation of the Jews in the House of Commons follows a similar trajectory. Jewish merchants were tolerated in London in the 17th century, for the most part, because of their trade and finance networks. The accession of William to the English throne was instrumental in creating a more tolerant regime. By 1753, the Jewish population gained enough political clout to present the Jewish Naturalization Bill in the House of Lords.[5] Benjamin Disraeli, Jewish by birth but baptized into the Church of England, became a Member of Parliament in 1837, and went on to become the Prime Minister of the UK in 1868 and 1874. Disraeli took the Christian oath but another Jewish candidate, Lionel de Rothschild, elected as one of the four Jewish members of Parliament from the City of London in 1849, refused to take the Christian oath. A compromise was reached in the two houses of Parliament, whereby Rotchschild was allowed to take the oath without committing to the Christian faith. The Jews Relief Act passed in 1858, and two years later, a more general form of oath was introduced for all members of Parliament.

Although the political representation of religious groups outside the established Protestant churches gradually increased in England and Ireland, this development was somewhat retarded in Scotland. Rather than growing tolerance of religious pluralism driving an expansion of religious liberty in Scotland, the situation improved because of the increasing disunity of the Presbyterian camp. As Bruce (1986) has forcefully argued, it was factionalism and bitter denominational rivalries among Scotch Presbyterians that undermined the established the authority of the Protestant establishment and hobbled its efforts to persecute minorities, including an influx of Irish Catholic immigrants. At the time of the 1707 Act of Union the Presbyterians were a single, united denomination established in the Scottish kirk. However, by the 1750s, Presbyterians had split into five groupings. Finally, the ``Great Disruption'' of 1843 led to the breakup of the mainstream Presbyterians into two groups, the evangelical Free Church which gave up all state privileges, and the established Church of Scotland.

In the political arena, the Great Reform Act of 1832 substantially lowered the property restrictions on voting and expanded regional representation in the Parliament. ``The Act represented a shift in favor of cities and the middle classes, and it almost doubled the size of the voting population to 800,000 people.'' A month after the Great Reform Act, the Parliament passed the Scottish Reform Act 1832 that also significantly increased the county (rural) franchise in Scotland from 3,200 to 31,000. The franchise in the burghs (urban) rose from what was effectively a self-electing closed electoral system of 1,300 council members to a far more representative 32,000 (Johnston 2013); these reforms severely constrained special interest legislating (including in religion) and ushered in a period of expansion in public welfare spending (Lizzeri and Persico 2004).

In short, liberalization happened because of an increase in the number of religious groups, none of which could claim a majority, and an increase in political representation of members of these groups. The ``diversity of views" North and Weingast hail as a feature of the parliamentary regime introduced in 1688 actually came about because of growing religious diversity born of factionalism, on the one hand, coupled with the expansion of the franchise which allowed disadvantaged groups greater representation, on the other. After a period of multiple rounds of secession within the Presbyterian camp and the increase in Parliamentary representation of the Catholics, Jews and other Protestants, Parliament reduced the monopoly privileges of the Presbyterians and moved in the direction of denominational equality. Similarly, the conservative interests were diluted by franchise extension, a factor having little to do with the Whigs or the institutions established by the Revolution. Simply put, increasing political representation in the context of religious pluralism forced the prevailing institutions to allow a wider set of beneficiaries (Lizzeri and Persico 2004).

Conclusion and Implications

We have reexamined the institutional legacy of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 on religious tolerance in Britain. Focusing on the crucial case of Scotland, we used historical process tracing and a systematic analysis of ecclesiastical legislation to show that rather than establishing conditions for religious liberty, the period after the Revolution continued to be dominated by special interest legislating, similar to the pre-revolutionary period. Worse still, the institutional structure that evolved after 1688 provided incentives for the Parliament to engage in the kind of `irresponsible' behavior attributed to the pre-revolutionary Crown. Doing so both suppressed religious liberties and undermined political reconciliation after 1688. The record is

more dismal than glorious: The Crown and the Episcopalians repressed the Presbyterians before 1688; Parliament and the Presbyterians repressed the Episcopalians after 1688. Conditions for religious liberty appeared much later in the 19th century as the Presbyterians faced secession and non-Presbyterian denominations and religions gained a foothold in the Parliament.

Despite criticism of many of North and Weingast's (1989) arguments, and claims that they have mis-specified mechanisms (Cox 2018; Ogilvie and Carus 2014; Pincus and Robinson 2014; Stasavage 2002), the claim that religious liberties advanced seems uncontested by social scientists. Greif and Rubin (2015) rightly argue that religion was as the heart of the politics behind the Revolution but claim that what really mattered was that government secularized after 1688. Parliamentary procedure and rule of law substituted divine right as a source of legitimacy. Hence, the Revolution established favorable conditions for expanding religious toleration (Gill 2008). In fact, the Revolution instituted rules that favored particular groups (Protestant Dissenters, Presbyterians) and protected the rent seeking of the established churches, a far cry from the general advance of secularism and religious liberty. Although these problems were manifest across British society, the Scottish case reveals them in sharp relief. Prior to 1688, the Crown suppressed the Scottish Presbyterians in favor of the Episcopalians. After 1688, the winning coalition of the Scottish Presbyterians and the English Parliament led to the permanent reinstatement of Presbyterianism in the Scottish Church. The Presbyterians enthusiastically adopted the mantle of leadership in the Scottish kirk and actively suppressed the Episcopalians.

The Revolution thus transferred power from one faction to the other, continuing the "arbitrary" religious repression North and Weingast treat as symptomatic of the pre-revolutionary Crown. Although the Revolution did force the Crown to commit to religious tolerance, it did not lead the Parliament to do so. As J.C.D. Clark (2012: 178) has put it, "The religiously neutral

state, formerly dated to the late seventeenth century, can no longer be located in that age: In Britain, hegemonic official ideology pictured the state as built on religious premises throughout the long eighteenth century and residually into the twentieth."

The benevolent view of the Revolution's legacy for civil rights could also be an overstatement. The nature of post-1688 religious politics mattered not only in normative terms of injustice and civil liberties denied, but also in terms of the social and political stability of Britain. The ongoing repression of Scottish Episcopalians and Catholics, alongside and favoritism toward the established Presbyterian kirk, helped to inspire decades of Jacobite agitation and rebellion. This repression complicated efforts by the British government to achieve social reconciliation and political stabilization.

Our argument that those groups party to the winning coalition in a revolutionary setting irresponsibly influence institutions to advance special interests and undercut their rivals extends to the institutional legacy of the Revolution in the context of property rights and fiscal discipline. Parliament might have enforced property rights and debt ceilings to the extent they served the private interests of the members of Parliament. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) show that public spending in the United Kingdom only increased gradually following franchise reforms. An increase in overall welfare of British subjects thus occurred much later than 1688, as Parliamentary institutions had to increase their set of beneficiaries with an increase in representation. We showed that the same pattern obtained in the religious domain.

Our argument is in accordance with selectorate theories (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The welfare effect of institutions are likely to expand (change) with the size and nature of the coalition in power. Although politically influential and commercially valuable religious minorities are more likely to enjoy toleration (Gill 2008), particularized institutions need not

yield general benefits. Future research should examine the relationship between franchise extension and the decline in private/special interest legislating, including in the sphere of religious regulation.

Our perspective travels beyond Britain and well into the contemporary period. Privileges for established religions and discrimination toward religious minorities are strongly associated with authoritarianism and violence (Grim and Finke 2011), as well as wtih rebellion and state failure (Fox 2004). The situation tends to worse, as was the case in Scotland, where religious minorities are unprotected by the judiciary (Finke et al. 2017). Our findings are also in accordance with Brathwaite and Bramsen (2011), who argue that a structural lack of religion-state separation, as was the case in post-revolutionary Scotland, can retard democratization in general and religious liberties in particular because state-supported religions can introduce partisan legislation in the religious sphere. In contrast to Driessen's view (2010), we think that a hand in glove church and state might be harmful to democratic consolidation and the legitimacy provided by religion could be a double-edged sword. In fact, we suspect our argument regarding the limited religious commitment of the post-revolutionary state is understated --- we examine *de-jure* commitment, it is possible for *de-facto* commitment to be even worse (Fox and Flores 2009).

It would be ironic if, in search for the origins of modern economic growth, a current generation of social scientists revived the Whiggish interpretation of history. More broadly, the claim that the Revolution of 1688 secularized British politics and advanced religious freedom may unintentionally bolster the widely held myth that liberty and progress advanced because of the triumph of Protestantism (Gregory 2012; Stark 2017). To be clear, we do not claim that Britain was especially bad in terms of religious freedom, the politicization of religion, or the

28

imposition of partial institutions that favored established religions over others. All of these things were common in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, and indeed are common to many times and places (Iannaccone 1998). We are also not attempting to impose an ahistorical standard of tolerance.[6]   Rather, we are arguing against the tendency in economic history and comparative politics to regard the British case as exceptional in the state's capacity to restrain abuse of power, protect individual rights, and create the conditions for growth and democracy that naturally spilled over into freedom of conscience.

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Notes

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[1] One measure of the wide influence of North and Weingast's theory of the role of credible commitments and parliamentary government in the making of British economic success is that, as of May 2020, more than 1,700 publications had cited it according to the Social Science Citation Index/Web of Science.

[2] North and Weingast also claim another reason for the limits on Parliamentary behavior: the destruction of the Crown's centralized administrative apparatus in 1641. However, this occurred during the Interregnum, prior to the 1688 Revolution.

[3] James VI (James I) introduced The Five Articles of Perth (passed by the Parliament in 1621) as a compromise with the Church of England. The Articles comprised of 1) private communion 2) private baptism 3) episcopal confirmation 4) observance of the holy days of Christ's life and 5) kneeling during communion (Stewart 2007).

[4] Notable appointments included Lord Spottiswood, the Archbishop of St. Andrews, who James VI appointed the President of the Exchequer in 1624.

[5] The Bill passed but was repealed in the same year after a surprisingly large public outcry (Katz 1996).

[6] See Landemore (2017) for an examination of the Icelandic constitutional experiment on religious rights as an emerging procedural `ideal type.'